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RECENT CASES
Advertising-Use of "Free," a Deceptive Practice
Under the Federal Trade Commission Act
Mary Carter Paint Co. sold two cans of paint for the price of one,
advertising the second can as being "free." The price charged was
comparable to the price of a single can of other nationally advertised
brands of paint of like quality.' The advertisements appeared in
newspapers and magazines of general circulation, and were announced
over radio and television across state lines.2 A typical Mary Carter
advertisement stated: "Buy One, Get One Free"; "Every Second Can
Free of Extra Cost"; or "Every Second Can Free." 3 In a hearing
before the Federal Trade Commission, the FTC, the Hearing Examiner determined that Mary Carter had no price for a single can
of paint; thus, it misrepresented the regular price of its paint and
falsely represented that a second can was given free with each
purchase. Accordingly, he issued a cease and desist order,4 requiring
respondent to refrain from this practice found to be in violation
of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.5 Offering to prove
that the second can was, in fact, free, Mary Carter appealed to the
Commission. On review, the Commission declined to hear Mary
Carter's proof and accepted the Hearing Examiner's finding that
Mary Carter's advertising was not permissible because the second
can of paint was not "free," that is, not a gift or gratuity; and, with
modifications, it adopted the Hearing Examiner's decision.6 The
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set aside the Commission's order.? On certiorari from the United States Supreme
1. Mary Carter has carried out this practice for more than ten years, distributing
its paints through retail outlets, including both company stores and franchised dealers,
in more than half of the states of the United States. Its total sales represent less
than 1% of national paint sales, but its sales have increased from 1 million dollars in
1955 to 12 million dollars in 1960. Mary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, 333 F.2d 654,
655 (5th Cir. 1964).
2. Mary Carter Paint Co., 60 F.T.C. 1827, 1828 (1962).
3. Mary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, supra note 1, at 655. n.1.
4. Mary Carter Paint Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 25480 (FTC) (Feb. 15, 1961).
5. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a), 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)

(1964).

The relevant portion of the act states simply: "Unfair

methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce, are declared unlawful."
6. Mary Carter Paint Co., supra note 2.

7. "We find ourselves in agreement with Commissioner Elman's dissenting opinion:
that the opinion of the Commission is completely erroneous; and that its order is
lacking in the precision and definiteness which the statute requires of such an order
as this. We reject, as Commissioner Elman does, the Commission's opinion: that
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Court, held, reversed and remanded to the FTC for clarification of
its order. The Federal Trade Commission would not be clearly in
error in finding Mary Carter's representation, that it had a usual
and customary price for single cans of paint when it had no such price,
a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act.8 FTC v. Mary
CarterPaintCo., 382 U.S. 46 (1965).
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 made no mention
of advertising or deception and proscribed only "unfair methods of
competition."8 The primary thrust was the protection of businessmen,
one from the other; and consumer interests received only incidental
protection.9 The jurisdiction of the Commission was based upon injury
to competition and mere injury to or deception of the consuming
public did not constitute an offense under the statute. 10 However, by
the Wheeler-Lea amendment of 1938,11 "unfair or deceptive acts and
practices in commerce" were placed in the same category as "unfair
methods of competition." This opened the way for the Commission to
protect the consumer, as well as honest members of the commercial
community. The determination of whether the use of the word "free"
in advertising constitutes a deceptive practice injurious to competitors or consumers has proved to be an especially difficult problem.
Prior to 1953, the FTC deemed it unfair to represent merchandise
as "free" if the gift was conditioned upon the recipient's purchasing
other merchandise or furnishing some service.' 2 In The Matter of
Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc.,13 Commissioner Mead summarized
the Commission's treatment of the use of "free" by saying:
Mary Carter's advertising is misleading because 'The second can of paint was not,
and is not now free'; that it was not, and is not now given without cost to the
retail purchaser since the purchaser paid the advertised price; and that this was,
and is now, the usual and regular retail price at which two cans of Mary Carter
paint were ordinarily sold." 333 F.2d 654, 657 (5th Cir. 1964).
8. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a), 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 52
Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964). For a brief historical sketch of
the events leading to the passage of the act, see Murphy, The Ethics of Retail Price
Advertising, 6 AzrruST BULL. 419 (1961).
9. In connection with the congressional history of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, see 63 CoNG. REc. 1962-64 (1914) (address of President Wilson delivered at
a joint session); S. REP. No. 1326, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913); H.R. REP. No. 533,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). See also FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 429-42 (1920)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
10. Raladam Co. v FTC, 42 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1930), aff'd, 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
11. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a), 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964).
12. See FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937) (free encyclopedias);
Rosenblum v. FTC, 47 F.T.C. 712 (1950), aff'd, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 905 (1952) (free wearing apparel); and Progress Tailoring Co. v.
FTC, 37 F.T.C. 277 (1943), aff'd, 153 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1946) (free suits).
An FTC Administrative Interpretation dated January 14, 1948, declared: "The use
of the word 'free' or words of similar import in advertising to designate or describe
merchandise sold or distributed in interstate commerce, that is not in truth and in
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The problem involved in the use of the word "free" or similar words in the
sale and distribution of merchandise should be approached by applying to
the representation made by the same
yardstick that should be applied to all
'14
advertising, viz: 'Is it true or false?
Thus, in order to use the word "free" as part of one's advertising, the

article "given away" had to be, in fact, free-no strings attached.

This state of the law continued until October, 1953, when the

Commission adopted its "Guides Against Deceptive Pricing,"'1 which
had been first enunciated in a decision reached by the majority of
the Commission a few weeks earlier in a proceeding against Walter
J. Black, Ine.16 Walter J. Black did business as The Classics Club
and Detective Book Club. To induce the purchase of their products,

the clubs advertised that a "free" gift would be given to those who
accepted trial membership invitations. The "free" gift offered by the

Classics Club consisted of two bound volumes of classics in Greek
literature, while the Detective Club offered three best-selling mysteries
to new members. An FTC Hearing Examiner determined that the

use of the word "free" in the advertisements was false, misleading,
and deceptive. In order to receive the "free" books an enrollee was
required to purchase the Club's current selection of the month as

well as four additional books during the ensuing twelve months.1 "
On appeal from the Hearing Examiner's initial decision, the Com-

mission reversed, concluding that the word "free" was a comparative
adjective which had no definite and absolute meaning. "However,"

the Commission went on to say, "in the public interest, and for the
advice, guidance and information of businessmen, we want, through
this opinion, to make the position of the Commission as clear as

possible." 8 In the future, the Commission concluded, it would be
considered an unfair or deceptive act or practice to use "free" in
advertisements.
fact a gift or gratuity or is not given to the recipient thereof without requiring the
purchase of other merchandise or requiring the performance of some service inuring
directly or indirectly to the benefit of the advertiser, seller or distributor, is considered by the Commission to be violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act."
See Walter J. Black, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 225, 231 (1953).
Thus, under a pre-1953 interpretation, Mary Carter's merchandising practice clearly
would have been regarded as violative of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
13. 48 F.T.C. 1297 (1952) (free books).
14. Id. at 1310.
15. Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, Guide V, adopted October, 1958, 23 Fed.
Reg. 7965 (1958); see also Policy Statement, December 3, 1953, 4 TRADE REc. IE.
f[40210, at 42081 (FTC Dec. 3, 1953). For the current guide, Guide IV, effective
January 8, 1964, see 29 Fed. Reg. 179 (1964).
16. Walter J. Black, Inc., supra note 12.
17. Id. at 227-30.
18. Id. at 235.
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(1)

When all of the conditions, obligations, or other prerequisites to the
receipt and retention of the "free" article of merchandise are not clearly
and conspicuously explained or set forth at the outset so as to leave no
reasonable probability that the terms of the advertisement or offer
might be misunderstood; or
(2) When, with respect to the article of merchandise required to be purchased in order to obtain the "free" article, the offerer either (1) increases the ordinary and usual price; or (2) reduces the quality; or
(3) reduces the quantity or size of such article of merchandise.' 9

Under the guides, the giving of a gift conditioned upon the purchase
of some article or product under a plan similar to that employed
by Mary Carter, was no longer a violation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, except under the special circumstances mentioned.
These guides, it is clear, were not fixed rules of law;20 they were,
as their name signifies, guides-intended to put businessmen on notice
of the factors which would influence future Commission decisions.21
The Supreme Court, faced with the question of whether the
Commission's holding constituted a departure from Commission policy
regarding the use of the commercially exploitable word "free," refused to hold that the Commission had departed from the policy
established under the Guides, and concluded that "there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's finding."22
In referring to the 1958 guides, the Court conceded that Mary Carter
had attempted to comply with them, but sustained the Commission's
finding that its offer complied in form only, and not in substance. z3
In answer to the respondents contention that it was forbidden to
introduce evidence demonstrating that the quantity and quality of
paint in one of its cans ,was equal to that of others comparably
19. Id. at 235-36.
20. In his dissenting opinion in Black, Commissioner Mead, who had written the
majority opinion in Book-of-the Month Club, referred to this new policy under the
guides as having "the virtue of flexibility and the vice of uncertainty." Walter J.
Black, Inc., supra note 12, at 240.
21. Prior to the Court decision in the Mary Carter case, the FTC held similar "buy
one and get one free" advertisements of paint manufacturers unfair and deceptive.
However, in each instance other kinds of deception were involved. See State Paint
Mfg. Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 25485 (FTC Feb. 7, 1964); Garland Co., 61 F.T.C.
552 (1962) (ficticious manufacturer on label); Ohmlac Paint & Ref. Co., 60 F.T.C.
419 (1962) (falsely represented factory selling price). In a related area, the FTC
restrained Sperry & Hutchinson Co. (S&H green stamps) from prohibiting merchants
from dispensing more than one trading stamp for each 100 worth of customer
purchases-thus halting the practice of giving consumers "double stamps." "bonus
stamps," and "free stamps." The FTC concluded that S & H deprived the consuming
public of a great number of additional trading stamps and unfairly interfered with the
merchants' conduct of their business. 3 TRADE REC. REP. II 17272, at 22584 (FTC Nov.
15, 1965).
22. FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46, 49 (1965).
23. Id. at 48.
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priced, the Court merely said that if such a claim could be established,
perhaps the deception was limtied to the point that Mary Carter
previously had a single can price when in fact it had not sold single
cans. However, the Court would not say whether this deception
violated the act,24 leaving it solely to the Commission to determine

what is deceptive.25
Justice Harlan, dissenting, criticised the Commission's order as
being too vague to be upheld by the courts. 26 He contended that
Mary Carter complied with the decision in Black27 and the general
policy statement issued by the Commission thereafter. Moreover,
he stated that if the Commission is going to depart from the policy
adopted in Black, it should have sound reasons for so doing; otherwise the change is in violation of section 10(e) of the Administrative
Procedure Act.28 The nature of the harm, either to competitors or
consumers, which would warrant any action by the FTC against
Mary Carter, was never demonstrated to the satisfaction of Justice
Harlan.
It appears that the decision is most unsatisfactory when viewed
from the standpoint of the business advertiser. The question immediately arises whether Black and the guides are still regarded by
the FTC as controlling. The Commission's original opinion made an
attempt to distinguish the facts in Black from those in Mary Carter.
It did so, first, on the basis that the article of purchase under Mary
Carter's plan had always been sold with the so-called "free article,"
thus converting what may have originally been a single can price
into a two-can price. In Black, on the other hand, the article of
purchase was not always the same article, the plan there constituting
a series of offers rather than a continuing offer of the same two
articles. A second distinction was that in Black it could be clearly
shown that the article of purchase did have a price of its own and
that the merchandise was regularly sold without a free article attached
to it, while in Mary Carter this was not the case.2 9 This attempt to
24. Ibid.
25. The Court has stated on other occasions that the Commission is in a better
position than the courts to determine what practices are "deceptive" under the act;
that these findings should be given great weight by reviewing courts, and should not
be disturbed unless arbitrary or clearly wrong. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965), 18 VAND. L. REV. 2009 (1965). A similar position was
taken by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC,
323 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1963).
26. FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., supra note 22, at 49 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
27. Walter J. Black, Inc., supra note 12.
28. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §
1009(e) (1964). "[Tlhe reviewing court shall . . . . (B) hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law....
29. Mary Carter Paint Co., 60 F.T.C. 1827, 1851-52 (1962).
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distingiush the cases led Mr. Justice Harlan to comment "[B]y failing
to spell out its rationale the FTC decision breeds the suspicion
that it is not merely ad hoc but quite possibly irreconcilable with
the Black case seemingly reaffirmed by the Commission in this
very proceeding."30 If the guides do still represent Commission
policy, exactly what the FTC requires for compliance remains a
mystery.31 Surely, manufacturers such as Mary Carter, which spend
huge sums promoting their products through advertising, deserve an
answer to that question.
The principal case also raises doubts as to the propriety of the
Commission's action in relation to the purposes of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, i.e., protection of competitors and consumers. Admittedly, the act was, in part, designed to prevent potential injury
32
by stopping unfair methods of competition in their incipiency;
however, neither the Supreme Court nor the FTC indicated that
anyone had been potentially endangered by Mary Carter's advertising; nor did they indicate that there had been any real injury as a
result of it. Assuming, as the Court did, that the price asked for
one can of Mary Carter paint corresponded to the price for other
brands of paint of similar quality, there could be neither actual
nor potential harm to the consumer; regardless of the words used
to advertise the product, the consumer ultimately stood to benefit.
The other basis for the FTC's action is the potential injury to competitors. In Colgate-Palmolive,33 where the defendant used mock-ups
for its shaving cream commercials on television, competitors conceivably may have felt restrained from using similar advertising for
30. FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., supra note 22, at 53 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Mr. Justice Harlan was not alone in his feeling, as evidenced by Commissioner
Elman's remarks in his dissenting opinion at the administrative level of the proceedings:
"Today's decision neither overrules nor reaffirms the rules established in Black. Instead,
the case is 'explained' and 'distinguished.' As a result, uncertainty and confusion
are being introduced, needlessly and unsettlingly, into an area of business activity
where businessmen and the bar have long regarded the Commission's position as
definite and clear. It would seem to me far better, if the Black case is to be overruled, that it be done forthrightly and without equivocation. Such a disposition of
the case, whatever else might be said about it, would have the merit of candor; and
businessmen and lawyers would at least know where the Commission now stands
in the matter." Mary Carter Paint Co., 60 F.T.C. 1827, 1853 (1962) (dissenting
opinion).
31. It is interesting to note the remark of Commissioner Mead, who wrote the
majority opinion in the first Book-of-the-Month Club case, only to be subsequently
overruled in Black: "I rather think the majority believe that they have made a
Solomon decision and have neatly disposed of a vexatious problem. I suggest that
their decision has not solved the problem. It has only postponed a problem which
will return in a different but more difficult and virulent form on the question of
compliance." Walter J. Black, Inc., supra note 12, at 240-41 (dissenting opinion).
32. FTC v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149 (1942). A legitimate query might be raised
as to whether an advertising practice ten years old is a new one.
33. Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra note 25; see 18 VA~N. L. Rnv. 2009 (1965).
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fear of transcending the limits of advertising integrity; thus, some
potential harm to competitors did exist. In the instant case, however,
the only deterrent to the use of an identical advertising and merchandising practice by competitors was their desire to maintain their
margin of profit. Any injury to competitors resulted not from Mary
Carter's action, but from their own refusal to compete, that is, their
refusal to offer a comparable product at a competitive price.

Anti-Trust Law-Conspiracy To Subvert
Competitor's Employees and Customers
Violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Plaintiff and defendant were competitive rack jobbers1 who sold
non-food items, such as cosmetics, records, toys, and drugs to grocery
stores and other retail merchandisers. A rack jobber's route salesmen
solicit and service customer accounts, and thus provide the only
direct customer contact. One of plaintiff's trusted employees left
to become defendant's sales manager and subsequently induced
several of plaintiff's route salesmen to join the defendant; at least
one of these route salesmen attempted to take several of plaintiffs
accounts with him. Plaintiff brought suit under the Sherman2 and
Clayton Acts3 for injunctive relief and treble damages, both of
1. "Rack jobbers are distinguished from other merchandisers by their method of
operation. A rack jobber furnishes a retailer with the racks on which the merchandise
is displayed, visits the outlet frequently to stock the racks, accepts merchandise which
has not been sold in a reasonable time for credit, and possesses some skill or knowledge
in the placing of items on the racks at favorable times in gives areas." Perryton
Wholesale, Inc. v. Pioneer Distrib. Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. II 71605, at 81732 (10th
Cir. Nov. 9, 1965), petition for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEc 3272 (U.S. Feb. 4,
1966) (No. 982).
2. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1964). The relevant parts
of these sections read as follows:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. . . .Every person who shall make any contract or engage
in any combination or conspiracy declared by sections 1-7 of this title to be illegal
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ... "
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor .... "
3. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964): "Any person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in which the
defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount of the
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
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which the district court granted. On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, held, affirmed. A conspiracy
to eliminate a competitor predominant in the area by subversion of

its employees and customers is an unreasonable restraint on trade
and violates section 1 of the Sherman Act. Perryton Wholesale, Inc.
v. Pioneer Distributing
Co., 5 TRADE BEG. REP. 1[ 71605 (10th Cir.
4
Nov. 9, 1965).
Most private suits involving the proselytizing of a competitor's
employees have concerned agreements against postemployment competition.5 Very few cases, however, involving facts similar to those
of the main case have arisen under the Sherman Act. 6 It is well
established that a conspiracy to eliminate a competitor by unfair
means may constitute an unreasonable restraint 7 on trade within
the meaning of the Sherman Act,8 but the limits of this doctrine are
not yet certain. The two cases providing the basis for the instant
court's opinion involved more than just employee piracy. In Albert

Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury, Inc.,9 two of plaintiff's trusted

employees, after soliciting plaintiff's customers in behalf of the de-

fendant corporation, induced other employees to leave plaintiff and
join the defendant. The jury made a special finding that the de-

fendant's acts, taken together, were not an unreasonable restraint
on interstate commerce.

In spite of this, the court affirmed the

judgment for the plaintiff and stated:
4. The Supreme Court has been asked to grant certiorari on the ground that the
plaintiff should not be compensated for the injury to its intrastate business since the
Sherman Act concerns only injury to interstate business. Perryton Wholesale, Inc. v.
Pioneer Distrib. Co., supra note 1.
5. See Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 H~Asv. L. REv. 625 (1960).
6. United States v. Simplex Time Recorder Co., 1 TRADE REG. REP. 1 1630 (D.C.
Mass. 1963) (manufacturer of time recording equipment prohibited by consent decree
from attempting to monopolize the industry by hiring away its competitor's important
personnel); United States v. Linen Supply Institute of Greater New York, Inc., 1
TRADE REG. REP. ir 1630 (D.C.N.Y. 1958) (linen suppliers prohibited by consent
decree from enticing employees of other suppliers to take employment with defendants
for purpose of injuring the other supplier in its business); Marquardt & Co. v.
Bulley, 1 TRADE REC. REP. f1 1630 (D.C.N.Y. 1941) (competitor's employment of
plaintiff's former salesman, who took with him certain lines of products formerly
handled exclusively by plaintiff, did not constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade
within the meaning of the Sherman Act).
7. The "rule of reason" was adopted early in the act's history and was expressed
in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911): "[T]he dread of enhancement of prices and other wrongs which it was thought would flow from the undue
limitation on competitive conditions caused by contracts or other acts of individuals
or corporations, led, as a matter of public policy, to the prohibition or treating as
illegal all contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of competitive
conditions .. " Id. at 58.
8. Atlantic Heel Co. v. Allied Heel Co., 284 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1960); Albert
Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp., 57 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1932).
9. Supra note 8.
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[We think it is not necessary to show an unreasonable restraint of
interstate trade as an accomplished fact, if a conspiracy is proved, the intent
and purpose of which, if carried out, would eliminate the largest competitor
of one of the conspirators in a particular section of the country, which
competitor controlled a substantial part of the trade in that section, and one
of the methods of suppressing such competition was unlawful or unfair
competition. Such a result, if accomplished, would clearly be an unreasonable restraint of trade .... If a conspiracy is proven, the purpose or intent
of which is by unfair means to eliminate a competitor in interstate trade
and thereby suppress competition, such a conspiracy, we think, is a violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 0

In Atlantic Heel Co. v. Allied Heel Co.," which relied heavily upon
the Pick-Barth decision, the paintiff charged a conspiracy, the purpose

of which was to destroy the plaintiff's interstate and foreign business.
Employee piracy was one of the means allegedly used by defendant

in furtherance of the conspiracy. 12 In upholding the sufficiency of

the complaint, the court held:
[We believe that the purpose of destroying a competitor by means that
are not within the area of fair and honest competition is a purpose that
clearly subverts the goal of the Sherman Act. It constitutes an interference
with the natural flow of interstate commerce which would exist under
conditions of fair and honest rivalry for the buyer's trade. 13

Thus a conspiracy to destroy a competitor by unfair means

4

is a

violation of the Sherman Act per se; that is, the unreasonableness of
the resulting restraint on trade is conclusively presumed and does not
have to be established by independent proof.15
10. Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp., supranote 8, at 102.
11. Supra note 8.
12. Other means alleged were: the stealing of trade secrets, false statements as to
the plaintiff's financial standing, harassment by means of a suit brought in bad faith
by the defendants for waste of corporate assets, and interferences with plaintiff's
source of raw materials.
13. Atlantic Heel Co. v. Allied Heel Co., supra note 8, at 884.
14. There have been no reported cases holding that a conspiracy to eliminate a
competitor in interstate commerce, without more, constitutes an unreasonable restraint
on trade within the purview of the Sherman Act.
15. The per se doctrine is well stated in Northern Pac. By. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1 (1958): "[Tlhe policy unequivocally laid down by the [Sherman] Act is
competition. And to this end it prohibits 'Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.' Although this
prohibition is literally all-encompassing, the courts have construed it as precluding
only those contracts or combinations which 'unreasonably' restrain competition. ...
However, there are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed
to be unreasonable and are therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se
unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids
the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into
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The court of appeals experienced little difficulty in arriving at
its decision in the instant case. It started with the the proposition
that a conspiracy to eliminate a predominant competitor by unfair
means is an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 16 The only remaining issue was whether a conspiracy
to eliminate a competitor by pirating his employees and customers
involved means sufficiently unfair to bring that rule into operation.
Relying upon somewhat dubious authority,17 the court held that
enticing a competitor's employees to desert him in circumstances
rendering it difficult to replace them constituted unfair competition.
Thus it concluded that a conspiracy to eliminate a predominant
competitor in interstate commerce by proselytizing its employees
and customers constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman Act.' 8
The decisions relied on by the court in reaching the decision in the
instant case are not precisely in point, for in both Pick-Barth and
Atlantic the subversion of employees was only one of several allegations contained in the complaint. The court of appeals thus extended
the per se conception to the situation in which the defendant lures
away a competitor's employees and customers with the intent to
destroy him. To what extent does this holding make the Sherman
Act available to businessmen injured by employee piracy? The test
applied by the court requires that the plaintiff first prove a conspiracy
to eliminate an interstate competitor. The pirating company generally
will use one of plaintiff's own employees to subvert plaintiff's key
personnel. Such cooperation will be sufficient in most cases to
establish a conspiracy. 19 The purpose or intent of the conspiracy
must be the elimination of a competitor predominant in interstate
commerce; but the court does not define "predominant." If it means
that the elimination of the pirated firm must result in the pirating
the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort
to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry
so often wholly fruitless when undertaken." Id. at 4-5.
16. Perryton Wholesale, Inc. v. Pioneer Distrib. Co., supra note 1, at 81733.
17. The court relied on Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917),
where the Court said: "Certainly, if a competing trader should endeavor to draw
customer [sic] from his rival . . . by persuading the rival's clerks to desert him
under circumstances rendering it difficult or embarrassing for him to fill their
places, any court of equity would grant an injunction to restrain this as unfair competition." Id. at 259 (dictum). The statement quoted by the court from this case has
nothing to do with the actual holding there; thus, the court's reliance on this case
appears unwarranted.
18. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. The instant case does not use the
words "per se" but the court does rely directly on Atlantic, which explicitly stated that
the violation was per se. Thus the violation in the main case is per se by implication.
19. A conspiracy does not have to be proved by direct testimony, but may be
inferred from things actually done. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v.
United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); Local 175, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. United
States, 219 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1955).
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firm's dominance in the given segment of interstate commerce,20 the
remedy provided by this case is of very limited application. 2' On
the other hand, "predominant" may mean merely "significant." The
court does not resolve this issue. If the court means that the injured
competitor need have only a significant share of the relevant market,
it may be strongly argued that the court is using the Sherman Act
to enforce private business morals-a purpose well beyond ,that of
furthering competition.22 Most of the business community seems to
regard employee piracy as a fact of business life, 23 and, except in a
limited number of situations, there has been no remedy at law for
such conduct. 24 While the possibility of a suit for treble damages may

effectively deter this practice, 25 at the same time, the antitrust laws
should not be distorted to accomplish results beyond their designated
purpose. Unfortunately, the court does not consider the possible
ramifications of its decision. To the extent that the holding does
make the Sherman Act available in employee piracy cases, the
instant decision offers the businessman a significant degree of protection; 26 in addition to treble damages, the successful plaintiff is
awarded reasonable attorney's fees,2 which are often substantial.2
The instant case, therefore, should result in more private Sherman
Act litigation involving employee piracy than has been experienced
20. See Sherman Act § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964),
quoted note 2 supra. Cases under this section have required that the defendant have
both "monopoly power" and the general intent to monopolize. American Tobacco Co.
v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1948). Section I does not require that the defendant
have this power to exclude competitors from interstate trade; all that is required is
an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce. The result of the instant case
indicates that facts normally constituting an attempt to monopolize may be treated as
an unreasonable restraint under § 1 if the defendant lacks the requisite monopoly
power for a § 2 violation.
21. For example, where there are numerous competitors in the particular segment
of interstate commerce, the elimination of a small competitor by a firm of similar size
would not give rise to a cause of action under the Sherman Act, since the pirating
firm would control only a small portion of the market involved.
22. The requirement of an unreasonable restraint on interstate trade is rather strict
and is not satisfied by every breach of business morals.
23. Furash, Industrial Espionage, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1959, p. 156.
24. Enticement of employees has been attacked by the Federal Trade Commission;
however, no reported cases have given relief in situations where the only complaint
was employee piracy. See 2 TADE BEc. REP. ff 7095; note 5 supra.
25. Note, 77 Hv. L. REv. 888, 955, 957 (1964).
26. Plaintiff could also file a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission or sue
for the common law tort of unfair competition; however, neither of these alternatives
presents the possibility of treble damages and attorney's fees which is offered by the
Sherman Act.
27. See supra note 2.
28. For example, in the main case the actual damages (before trebling) were
$8,442.07, and the -attorney's fees -awarded were $12,500.
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to date. Future plaintiffs, however, may well find the courts more
willing to limit the doctrine of the main case than to expand it. 9

Conflict of Laws-Depositor's Request That
Disposition of Foreign-Owned Funds Deposited In

New York Bank Be Governed By New York Law
Upheld as a Matter of Public Policy
The Duke and Duchess of Arion deposited cash and securities in
joint accounts in New York and London banks' from 1919 until the

end of the Spanish Civil War. The husband and wife were Spanish
domiciliaries, neither of whom had ever been to New York. In
establishing and continuing these accounts, they agreed, either by
express written agreements 2 or by signed survivorship account con-

tracts in accordance with New York law, 3 that the survivorship laws
of New York4 should govern any future disposition of these funds. The
29. Courts might require direct proof of a specific intent to eliminate a competitor;
a substantial threat to competition, demonstrated by plaintiff's having a significant
portion of the relevant market; and/or the likelihood of plaintiff's elimination, evidenced

by defendant's present success and market power.
1. In addition to an undisclosed amount deposited in the London banks, approximately $1,905,000 was deposited in four New York banks. Virtually all of the assets at
one time or another prior to the husband's demise were in joint accounts subject to
survivorship agreements signed by the husband and wife.
2. The express agreement was made in connection with a joint account deposited
in the Guaranty Trust Company and provided that the assets might be withdrawn
by either joint tenant during their lives; that the survivor was to have all the assets
upon the death of the other; and that the rights of each were to be governed by
New York law. Wyatt v. Fulrath, 38 Misc. 2d 1012, 1014, 239 N.Y.S.2d 486, 489
(Sup. Ct. 1963).
3. See note 2 supra. The survivorship account forms provided for substantially the
same arrangement, except that the provision expressly requesting the application of
New York law was omitted. Each joint account contract of deposit provided that the
property was subject to disposal by either party or the survivor. Ibid.
4. N.Y. BANmG LAw, § 675 (effective June 1, 1965) (formerly N.Y. Banking
Law, §§ 134(3), 239(3)): "(a) When a deposit of cash, securities, or other property
has been made or shall hereafter be made in or with any banking organization .. .in
this state . . . in the name of such depositor . . . and another person and in form

to be paid or delivered to either, or the survivor of them, such deposit . .. and any
additions thereto made, by either of such persons . . . shall become the property of
such persons as joint tenants and the same . . . shall be held for the exclusive use
of the persons so named, and may be paid or delivered to either during the lifetime
of both or to the survivor after the death of one of them. . . . (b) The making of
such deposit . . . shall, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, be prima facie
evidence, in any action or proceeding to which the banking organization ... [or] ...
surviving depositor . . . is a party, of the intention of both depositors . . . to create a
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New York survivorship laws conflict with the Spanish Community
Property Laws in that the New York law provides that marital prop-

erty is held in joint tenancy with rights of survivorship, while the
Spanish law provides that it is held as community property with
one half of the property vesting immediately in the estate of a deceased spouse and the other half vesting in the survivor.5 The latter

further provides that any agreement to dispose of marital property in
a manner different than that provided by Spanish law is void."

Following the death of the husband, the wife assumed control of the
funds in both New York and London, and executed a valid will
purporting to dispose of the property located in the New York banks.
During probate of this will, the husband's estate instituted the present

action to establish title to one-half of the property held in sole or
joint accounts in the New York and London banks at the time of the
husband's demise. 7 The New York Supreme Court dismissed the

complaint, and the appellate division affirmed. 9 On permissive appeal

to the court of appeals, held, affirmed. As a matter of public policy,
New York can recognize the deposit of foreign-owned funds in New
joint tenancy and to vest title to such deposit . . . in such survivor." This language
is substantially the same as that in §§ 134(3) and 239(3) which were in effect at
the time of the prior decisions in this action.
5. SPANISH Crvn, CoDE art. 1407, cited in Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211
N.E.2d 637, 638, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233, 235 (1965). The code provides that all marital
assets are community property until and unless provei to belong to one of the parties
privately, and that on the death of a spouse, one half of the community property
immediately vests in the survivor, and the other half in the estate of the deceased
spouse.
6. SPANISH Crv-m CODE:, arts. 1334, 1394, cited in Wyatt v. Fulrath, supra note 5, at
638-39, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 235. Spouses are prohibited from renouncing their rights and
obligations concerning community property by gift, contract, or any other means, and
any such disposition of community property in violation of this prohibition is void.
7. This action was brought by Wyatt, as ancillary administrator c.t.a. of the
Estate of Joaquin Fernandez de Cordova y Osma, Duque de Arion, against Fulrath,
individually and as Executor under a will of Maria de la Luz Mariatequi y Perez de
Barradas, Duquessa de Arion, the First National City Bank of New York, Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company of New York (formerly Guaranty Trust Company), and the
Chase Manhattan Bank. The court, however points out that the controversy here does
not involve the custodians, but is between the representatives of the parties. Id. at
638, 262 N.Y.S.2d 234.
8. This action was first presented to the trial term of the Supreme Court (26 Misc.
2d 554, 207 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct. 1960)) where it was dismissed; the court found
that the banks' presence before the court in this action was not a sufficient reason for
the court to retain discretionary jurisdiction, since all orders of the surrogate court in
the probationary proceedings could be carried out due to that court's jurisdiction over
the executor of.the estate. On appeal to the appellate division (13 App. Div. 2d 250,
215 N.Y.S.2d 970 (1st Dep't 1961)), the court, reversing in a per curiam opinion,
found that the supreme court should exercise its discretion and retain jurisdiction, as
there appeared to be some question about the ability of the Surrogate's orders to be
enforced against the banks. On remand to the trial term (38 Misc. 2d 1012, 239
N.Y.S.2d 486 (1963)), the court dismissed on the merits.
9. 22 App. Div. 2d 853, 254 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1964) (affirmed without
opinion).
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York banks as a physical and legal submission of the property to
New York law, and will honor the depositor's request that its future
disposition be governed by New York law. 10 Wyatt v. Fulratkt 16
N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965).

Conflicts of laws rules are determined by the application of the
various policies of the forum to specific factual situations. Each
combination of policies which bears on a given factual situation demands a particular choice of law according to the specific policies
considered to be of paramount importance. While the court appears
to have broad discretion in this choice, due to the policy-oriented

nature of conflicts problems, in reality the common law tradition of
stare decisis requires the formulation and application of general rules

to govern the choice of law applicable to various factual situations."
The depositing of foreign-owned property in the forum jurisdiction has
given rise to compelling, specific policy considerations in addition to
the general considerations such as ease and effectiveness of administration which are present in any conflicts case.' 2 Both the policy of
attempting to satisfy the justified expectations of the parties, 3 and the
policy of applying the law with which the parties are most familiar 4
have particular importance in the sensitive area of property rights.
These policies, supported by principles of international comity 5 and
10. After the husband's death, the wife transferred $375,000 from the London
accounts to those in New York. The court refused to determine the title to these
funds, and remanded this portion of the case to the special term for a decision in
accordance with English Community Property laws and the English Conflict of Laws
rules. Wyatt v. Fulrath, supra note 5, at 640, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
11. See generally Cn.FAm, GRISWOLD, REESE & ROSENBERG: CASES ON CONFLIct
OF LAws (5th ed. 1964); Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52
CoLmi. L. REv. 959, 978-80 (1952); Paulsen and Sovern, 'Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 969 (1956); Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A
Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 TuL. L. REv. 4 (1944).
12. Other considerations include the desirability of certainty as to the law to be
applied to given factual situations; the forum's attitude in regard to a given type of
factual situation; the policy of not enforcing another forum's penal laws; the court's
familiarity with the law to be applied; the policy that the law reasonably in the
minds of the parties should be applied; and the policy of protecting rights which
have already vested in the parties by operation of other laws.
13. Property rights occupy an exalted position in the common law system and
tradition; hence legal acts which affect such rights are stringently circumscribed by property laws. Since such laws and the results of their application differ widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and since drastic consequences may result from the application
of a law different than that anticipated by the parties, the policy of satisfying their
justified expectations has developed in order to prevent harmful surprise to the parties.
14. Many considerations led to the formation of the policy of applying the law with
which the parties are most familiar. Among these is the fact that the law with which
the parties are chargeable with knowledge, and the law which the parties may be
presumed to have had in mind at the time of the challenged act, is the law with
which the parties are most familiar. Therefore, this law is the law which should be
applied to determine their rights arising from this occurrence.
15. See Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 133 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1955),
aff'd, 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956); Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food
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reciprocal property treaties,' have dictated a general rule that the
rights of foreign depositors to property deposited in the forum juris-

diction are to be determined by application of the law of their
domicile.' 7 This general rule is applied both to cases involving
movables' 8 and to cases involving foreign-deposited marital property. 19
However, within these broad classes of categories arise specific
factual situations which evoke contrary policies of superior import and
create exceptions to the application of the general rule. Thus, the
policy of retaining the maximum local control over property the title

to which is held locally may demand the application of domestic law.20

The policy of honoring the parties' contractually expressed intent as
to the law which they desire to govern their rights may also require

the application of domestic law.2 ' Finally, "public policy" may
dictate a choice of domestic law. "Public policy" most frequently
demands employment in a negative sense in order to prevent a result,
due to the application of foreign law, contrary to what is deemed to
be an overriding interest of the forum22 Occasionally, however, it
is applied in an affirmative sense, virtually without regard to conflicting policy considerations, to bring about a result which the forum
generally seeks.P Thus, in regard to both foreign-owned movables
Co., 146 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Cal. 1956). See also 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935);
Cheatham, American Theories of Conflicts of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HAnV.
L. REV. 361 (1945); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws, Foreign Created Rights, 8 TrxAs L.
REv. 173 (1930).
16. See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503
(1947); see generally WILSON, UNITED STATES Co1i2a-RcIAL TREATIES AND INTERA-

TroNAL LAw (1960); Bayitch, Conflict Law in United States Treaties, 8 MIAu, L.Q.
501 (1954).
17. See Matter of Mesa y Hernandez's Estate, 172 App. Div. 467, 159 N.Y. Supp.
59 (lst Dep't), aff'd, 219 N.Y. 566, 114 N.E. 1069 (1916); Bonati v. Welsch, 24 N.Y.
157 (1861); see generally 1 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS: A CoMPsARATvE STUDY (2d
ed. 1958); MARSH, MARrrAL PROPERTY IN TIM CONFLICT or LAWS (1952); and
Harding, Matrimonial Domicil and Marital Rights in Movables, 30 MiCH. L. RiV. 859
(1932).
18. See Cross v. United States Trust Co., 131 N.Y. 330, 30 N.E. 125 (1892).
19. See Poe v. Seabor, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Bonati v. Welsch, supra note 17;
RFsTATm&ENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 290, 292 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
20. This policy has particular application to trust property and investment property.
See Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65 (1933); note 28 infra.
21. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Film Classics, Inc., 156 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1946);
A. S. Rampall, Inc., v. Hyster Co., 3 N.Y.2d 369, 144 N.E.2d 371, 165 N.Y.S.2d 475
(1957). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWs § 332a (Tent, Draft No.
6, 1960); UNIFoR CoM mCIAL CODE §§ 1-105.
22. See CHEATHAm, GRISWoLD, REESE & RoSENBmER, op. cit. supra note 11 at 403-05.
See also Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918); Leflar,
Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HAnv. L. REv. 193
(1932).
23. See note 22 supra. See also Wallan v. Rankin, 173 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1949);
Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242 N.W. 329 (1932); see generally Katzenbach,
Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in International Law,
65 YALE L.J. 1087 (1956).
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and foreign-owned marital property, exceptions to the -general rule
may be created to allow determination under domestic law of the
rights of foreign depositors to property in custody in the forum
jurisdiction, but such exceptions must be based upon strong policy
considerations and be applicable only to limited factual situations.
The instant case presented the question of whether New York
would recognize and enforce a contractual agreement between a
Spanish-domiciled husband and wife, void under Spanish law, that
rights to their property located in New York be governed by New
York law.2 4 The court pointed out that rights flowing from agreements
regarding the disposition of marital property are usually determined
by the laws of the marital domicile.25 However, the majority argued
that, irrespective of this general rule, New York may as a matter of
public policy determine whether to apply its own law to foreignowned property deposited in New York, and whether to honor the
depositors' choice of New York law. Without discussing their reasons
for rejecting the general rule, the court pointed to the New York
Personal Property Law,26 the Decedent Estate Law,27 and Hutchison
v. Ross2 ' as being indicative of a policy of applying New York law to
foreign-owned property deposited in New York.2 9 The court concluded that the parties, by their intentional resort to the protection
of New York law, had invoked this policy, and that it enabled New
York to honor at once the parties' physical and legal submission of
their property to New York law and their contractually expressed
desire that New York law govern their rights. The court then found
that under New York law the wife had proper title to the funds held
in the New York banks at the time of her husband's demise, and that
24. Wyatt v. Fulrath, supra note 5, at 638, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
25. Ibid.
26. N.Y. Pans. Pno,. LAw, § 12-a, provides, inter alia, that New York will honor
requests in a trust instrument for the application of New York law. See also N.Y.
BAxniNo LAW, § 675.
27. N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAW, § 47, provides, inter alia, that New York will honor
testamentary requests by foreign domiciliaries that New York law govern the testamentary disposition of their property.
28. Supra note 20. The Ross case involved a trust created in New York by a
husband and wife domiciled in Quebec, Canada. The trust was created for the
benefit of the wife after the revocation of a first trust created pursuant to an antenuptial agreement. This revocation was plainly void under the ante-nuptial agreement
provisions of the laws of Quebec. The trust instrument tendered title to the New
York trustees, and specifically requested the application of New York law. The court
complied with the request, saying, "Physical presence in one jurisdiction is a fact ....
When the owner of personal property authorizes its removal from his domicile . . . he
must be deemed to know that his property comes under the protection of and subject
Id. at 382-88, 187
to, the laws of the jurisdiction to which it has been removed.
N.E. at 68.
29. The policy referred to is hereinafter discussed and denominated as a "depository
policy."
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she had effectively disposed of this property by her will. 30 The
minority took the position that the Spanish Civil Code was "completely applicable," and should have governed the disposition of the
disputed property. 31 The dissent accused the majority of "throwing
overboard" the "strongest conflict rules,"32 and argued that these rules,
as expressed in the Matter of Mesa y Hernandez's Estate,3 were controlling in the instant case. They developed out of the policies of
accommodation and comity between sovereign states, and should not
be overturned without being proven to be outdated or unjust.3 The
minority found no such proof in the instant case. It further contended
that even if, contrary to general conflicts principles, New York were
to allow the foreign depositors' expressed intent to determine the
applicable law, the instant expression was insufficient to justify the
choice of New York law. Thus the minority concluded that there
was no justification for holding, as in their opinion the majority held,
that "any temporary deposit for emergency safekeeping of personal
property in New York vaults puts the property under New York law
for all purposes regardless of the ancient maxims, regardless of the
law of the domicile, and regardless of the intent of the parties."35
The majority opinion suffers from the method employed to arrive
at a desirable end. As the dissent recognized, the policies favoring
stare decisis are of great weight in conflicts cases. An exception to a
general conflicts rule should be founded only on strong policy considerations, and should be limited to specific factual situations. The
exception, the applicable factual situation, and the policy foundations
should be clearly set out and examined. It is at this point that the
majority opinion fails to lay a proper foundation for the judicial
inauguration of the depository policy.36 Neither the new policy nor
30. Wyatt v. Fulrath, supra note 2, at 639, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 237-38.
31. Id. at 640, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 237. See also notes 5 & 6 supra.
32. The three rules mentioned by the minority are: First, with certain exceptions,
"the law of the domicile of the owner governs as to the devolution of personal property."
Second, "the law of the matrimonial domicile controls as to the property and contract
rights of husband and wife inter sese." and Third, "whether such property is separate
or community property is determined by the law of the matrimonial domicile." Id. at
.641, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
33. Supra note 17. Mesa was a transfer tax proceeding involving a widow's claim,
based on Cuban law, to one-half of personalty held in New York custody accounts.
The court held that "the law of matrimonial domicile governed, not only as to all
the rights of the parties to their property in that place, but as to all personal property
everywhere." Id. at 477, 159 N.Y.S. at 67.
34. Wyatt v. Fulrath, supra note 5, at 640, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 237. The court
stated, "Conflicts of laws rules . . . are the accepted methods of accomodation
and comity between sovereign states, worked out consensually over the centuries,
not abritrarily or from mere politeness but as expressing reason and justice. . . . The
twentieth century with its shrinking distances and enlarging wars is a poor time to make
sudden and uncalled for changes particularly when the changes are urged upon us not
because the old rules are outdated or proven to be unjust ..
35. Id. at 643, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
36. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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its factual and public policy foundations are discussed. One is left
with the impression that an arbitrary change in the law has been
made leaving but a nameless, formless policy to guide an attorney in
advising his client; yet there is little doubt that this policy has
tremendous potential effect on the property law of New York. The
minority falls prey to much the same error. Neither opinion states
clearly that what has really occurred is that an exception applicable
to deposited property has been created, and that the general rules
as to movables and marital property most likely have not been discarded. Both opinions similarly fail to discuss adequately the newly
espoused policy rule, its foundations, or the breadth of its application.
These failures, given the complexity of the problem, will undoubtedly
result in confusion until the court of appeals is able to hand down a
clarifying opinion. It is to be hoped that such an opinion will soon be
forthcoming.
The minority opinion correctly assessed the potential impact of
this decision.37 The majority argued that the deposit of property in
New York pursuant to an intentional resort to the protection and
stability of New York law requires the application of that law to
govern the rights of the depositors to that property regardless of the
domiciliary law. The "depository policy" is applied in the affirmative
sense as a policy designed to bring about a specific result. This
seems clear from the facts of the case, particularly in light of
the lack of specificity of the request for the application of New York
law. The court implied not only that a request for the application of
New York law may not be necessary, but that, in the absence of a
specific request to the contrary, deposit of funds in New York will
be indicative of an intent that New York law should govern the
rights of the depositors. Regardless of contrary or voiding provisions
of foreign law or state prohibitions against foreign deposits, the
rights will be determined and protected by New York law, if they are
actually able to get the property to New York. The depository policy
raises one prime policy problem of its own which should be mentioned: Can and should New York pass laws and make rules of
relatively mandatory application which will govern the rights of
parties who are situated in vastly different cultures and circumstances, but who deposit funds in New York? It should be mentioned,
however, that this problem is somewhat alleviated by the ability of
the depositors to request the application of their own laws. The
instant decision is a long step towards a depository policy allowing
the deposit of property in New York, under any circumstances, with
the assurance that rights to it will be determined by the application
of New York property laws.
37. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
38. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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Constitutional Law-Applicability of Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 to Wheat Grown
On State-Owned Farms
The State of Ohio produced, on state owned farms located at various
mental and penal institutions, wheat in excess of the farms' acreage
allotments as established by the County Agricultural and Conservation Committees under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.1
The wheat produced was used and consumed by the institutions
in accordance with the state constitution. 2 The United States filed
a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment as to the liability of
the state 3under the act, and to recover a money judgment for
"penalties" for the years 1954 through 1957. The district court
granted summary judgment in the amount of 27,605.40 dollars. On
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
held, reversed. When wheat grown on state owned farms in excess
of federally imposed acreage allotments is expressly prohibited by
the state from entering, directly or indirectly, interstate or foreign
commerce, the provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938 do not apply. United States v. Ohio, 354 F.2d 549 (6th Cir.
1965), -rehearingdenied, Jan. 21, 1966.
In Wickard v. Filburn,4 the United States Supreme Court was
directly concerned with the constitutionality of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938. Prior to reaching the constitutional question,
however, the court found it essential to interpret the statute. Determining that Congress intended to regulate wheat consumed on
1.Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 31, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1281
(1964).
2. On'o CoNST. art. II,§ 41: "Laws shall be passed providing for the occupation
and employment of prisoners sentenced to the several penal institutions and reformatories in the state; and no person in any such penal institution or reformatory while
under sentence thereto, shall be required or allowed to work at any trade, industry or
occupation, wherein or whereby his work, or the product or profit of his work, shall
be sold, farmed out, contracted or given away; and the goods made by persons under
sentence to any penal institution or reformatory without the State of Ohio, and such
goods made within the State of Ohio, excepting those disposed of to the state or
any political subdivision thereof or to any public institution owned, managed or
controlled by the state or any political subdivision thereof, shall not be sold within
this state unless the same are conspicuously marked 'prison made."'
3. The penalty provisions of the act are as follows: "(2) Whenever farm marketing
quotas are in effect with respect to any crop of wheat, the producers on a farm shall
be subject to a penalty on the farm marketing excess of wheat . . . . (3) The farm
marketing excess for wheat shall be regarded as available for marketing, and the
penalty . . . shall be computed upon twice the normal production of the excess
acreage...." Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 31, as amended,
55 Stat. 203 (1941), 7 U.S.C. § 1340(2)-(3) (1964).
4.Wickard v.Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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the farm where it was grown, 5 the Court found the 1938 Act constitutional. It had already established' that the commerce power
extended to regulation over intrastate activities substantially affecting
interstate commerce. However, the issue in Filburn was whether
the commerce power extended to the regulation of "production not
intended in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the
farm."7 The Court there stated that one of the primary purposes
of the act was to limit the supply and increase the price of wheat."
Home-grown wheat would defeat and obstruct this purpose by flowing into the market to check increased wheat prices, when and
if the price rose, even though the farmer did not originally intend
to market the wheat. Further, even if the wheat was never marketed,
it would compete with purchases on the market by supplying a need
of the person who grew it.9 It was found that such home-consumed
wheat would have a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. 10 Even though Filburn's own contribution to the demand
for wheat was trivial, 'his contribution, taken together with that of
many others similarly situated, . . . [was] far from trivial."" Despite
the broad scope of Filburn, questions pertaining to the constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 have continued to
be a source of litigation. While some courts have summarily dismissed the contention of unconstitutionality, 12 others have considered
constitutional objections and have upheld the act. Yet it is significant
that the point of attack generally has not been that Congress lacks
power under the commerce clause,'13 but rather that the power as
exercised infringes upon personal liberties. It has been held that
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 does not violate the first
amendment guarantee of freedom of religion, 14 fifth amendment
guarantee of due process,' 5 or the privileges and immunities clause
of article IV.' 6 It appears that the Supreme Court has accepted
5. Id. at 128-29.
6. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
7. Wickard v. Filburn, supra note 4, at 118.
8. Id.at 115.
9. Id. at 128.
10. Id. at 129.
11. Id. at 128.
12. Weir v. United States, 310 F.2d 149 (8th Cir. 1962); Corpstein v. United
States, 262 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1958).
13. But see United States v. Haley, 166 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Tex.), rev'd per curiam,
358 U.S. 644, motion to vacate denied, 359 U.S. 977 (1959). The district court held
that the regulation of wheat which was consumed solely on the farm where grown
was not within the commerce power of Congress. See Note, 38 NEB. L. REv. 1048
(1959).
14. United States v. Kissinger, 250 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1958).
15. Ibid.
16. United States v. Stangland, 137 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. Ind.), aft'd, 242 F.2d
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federal regulation of the national economy where the activity affects
interstate commerce. 17 Perhaps for this reason, recent attempts to
avoid the penalties of the Agricultural Adjustment Act have relied
upon the grounds of statutory construction. The Supreme Court
itself, by failing to define the terms used in Wickard v. Filburn,8
inadvertently induced such appeals. Thus, it was unsuccessfully
contended in United States v. Johnson9 that wheat which was palatable only to hogs was not suitable for milling or marketing; and for
that reason it did not affect interstate commerce. In United States
v. Stangland,20 it was held that "The farm marketing excess of wheat
is, by law, wheat 'regarded as available for marketing."' And in
United States v. Cady,21 the district court found that a farmer was
843 (7th Cir. 1957). See also Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939), which held
that the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 did not unconstitutionally delegate
authority.
17. "The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of
them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution
of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce .

.

.

. The power . . .

acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution. . . . [N]o
form of state activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by
the commerce clause to Congress." United States v. Wrighvood Dairy Co., 315
U.S. 110, 119 (1942).
18. Supra note 4. In the course of its opinion, the Court used the terms, "available
for marketing" and "marketable condition," in describing the excess wheat produced
by the farmer in that case. Apparently, it considered the terms to be synonymous, but
neither term was defined. The definition of "available for marketing" is found in
the statute. See note 3 supra. "Market" was defined in § 1301(b)(6)(A) of the
act: "'Market' in the case of . . . wheat, means to dispose of, in raw or processed
form, by voluntary or involuntary sale, barter, or exchange, or by gift inter vivos,
and in the case of corn and wheat, by feeding (in any form) to poultry or livestock
which, or the products of which, are sold, bartered, or exchanged, or to be so
disposed of .... ." Thus, one interpretation of the language would be that the
term "shall be regarded as available for marketing" is defined by § 1301(b) (6) (A).
But it must be noted that sub-part (3) of § 1340 is preceded by the clause,
"Notwithstanding the other provisions of this chapter-." This clause may indicate
that "marketing" does not have the same meaning in both sections. Furthermore,
the terms "available" and "shall be regarded" are given no explanation. A possible
explanation of the use of "marketing" in the act may be that Congress was apprehensive of explicitly stating that it intended to control consumption. The Court said
in Filburn: "The Government's concern lest the Act be held to be a regulation of
production or consumption, rather than of marketing, is attributable to a few dicta
and decisions of this Court which might be understood to lay it down that activities
such as 'production,' 'manufacturing,' and 'mining' are strictly 'local' and, except in
special circumstances which are not present here, cannot be regulated . . . . [H]owever . .. questions of the power of Congress are not to be decided by reference to any
formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature such as 'production'
and 'indirect' and foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the activity in
question upon interstate commerce." Id. at 119-20.
19. 155 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Ark. 1957).
20. 137 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. Ind. 1957).
21. 184 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mont. 1960). Cady, a farmer, produced wheat in excess
of his acreage allotment and was notified that he should either remit the penalty or
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not liable for penalties on the farm marketing excess because the
wheat, having been destroyed by fire, was "not available for marketing" when the penalty became payable.
While no previous case has arisen involving a state challenge to
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, there have been significant
cases in related areas. 22 In Case v. Bowles,2 3 for example, the state
of Washington maintained that the Emergency Price Control Act
should not be construed to apply to state-owned timber sold to gain
revenue for an essential state function, education. The Court held
that if there were to be an exemption, it would have to be made
by Congress and not by the judiciary.24
In the instant case, the circuit court was faced solely with a
problem of statutory construction. While it found the facts to be
distinguishable from Wickard v. Filburn, the correctness of the Filburn
interpretation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 was not
questioned. It was conceded that the act applied to all wheat producers, including state-owned 25 farms "when the wheat can be said
to be 'exerting a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."'
Hence, the narrow question was whether, under the circumstances,
the wheat produced in excess of the acreage allotment had a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. Prior to answering
this question, the court noted that the state constitution prevented
store the excess with the Secretary of Agriculture. Cady stored the wheat on his
farm where it was subsequently destroyed by fire. The United States sought to recover
the penalty for the excess wheat even though it was destroyed. In holding that the
wheat was not "available for marketing," the court reasoned that there was no
sale, disposition, or use of the wheat as there was in Wickard v. Filburn, supra note 4.
22. The power of the United States to remove obstructions to interstate and
foreign commerce is superior to that of the states to provide for the welfare of their
inhabitants, as held in Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925). State
activity should be subject to regulation when it is capable of obstructing an act
of Congress which is all-embracing in scope and national in purpose. United States
v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). A state will not be exempted from regulation
when the exemption would defeat the purpose of Congress. California v. United
States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944). In each of these cases, the state argued that, unless
expressly included, federal regulatory statutes should not apply to a state performing a public function in its sovereign capacity.
23. 327 U.S. 92 (1946). The federal government sought to enjoin the sale of timber
lands by the state of Washington. Washington law required the land to be sold to
the highest bidder with the proceeds going to support public schools. However,
the price which was bid was in excess of the price ceiling set by Price Regulation No.
460, 8 Fed. Reg. 11850, as amended, 8 Fed. Reg. 13023 (1943), as authorized
under the Emergency Price Control Act, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (1942), as amended,
58 Stat. 640 (1944), added by ch. 214, 59 Stat. 306, (1945). The injunction, which
required the state to conform to the price ceiling, was granted.
24., See 45 Micir. L. REv. 94 (1946) and the cases cited therein.
25. The statute provides: "The term 'person' means an individual, partnership,
firm, joint-stock company, corporation, association, trust, estate, or any agency of a
State." 52 Stat. 31 (1939), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(8) (1964). (Emphasis
added.)

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 19

the wheat from being "available for marketing" and from moving in
interstate or foreign commerce. 26 At this point the court said: "We
find no language in the statute and nothing in the legislative history
indicating an intent on the part of Congress to extend the wheat
quota system in such a way as to interfere with these functions and
obligations of a state...

."27

A review of Wickard v. Filburn'e revealed

that the wheat produced by Filburn had been "available for marketing" even though the farmer had used and consumed for family
purposes all of the wheat grown. Such wheat could be channeled into
interstate commerce. As the Supreme Court had found in Filburn,
such home-consumed wheat would exercise a substantial effect on
price and market conditions because "being in a marketable condition"
-29 The circuit court then consuch wheat "overhangs the market.
cluded that these conditions are not found in the instant case. The
wheat produced by the state of Ohio was neither in a "marketable
condition" nor did the wheat, under the circumstances, "overhang the
market." Furthermore, the contention that the state-consumed wheat
would affect the total demand for the product was rejected. The
argument that the excess wheat grown by the state would have an
effect on interstate commerce by satisfying a need which would otherwise be reflected in purchases on the market was considered to be conjectural.30 This reduction in demand, being merely speculative,
would not "exert any substantial effect on interstate commerce." Then,
carefully limiting the decision to the facts of the case, the court stated
that it was unwilling to construe the statute as applicable in the
absence of a clearly expressed congressional intent.
The court in the instant case was confronted with policy considerations not present in Filburn. There, the Supreme Court construed
the Agricultural Adjustment Act with respect to an individual farmer
who operated a farm as a business. Here, the circuit court interpreted the act as it applied to a state operating farms in its public
26. The absoluteness of the prohibition in the Ohio Constitution may be questioned.
While the section does provide that, ". . . no . . . product or profit of [the convict's]
." it adds,
. . . work, shall be sold, farmed out, contracted or given away ....
incongruously, that such goods "shall not be sold within this state unless the same are
conspicuously marked 'prison made."' Oiuo CONST. art. II, § 41.
27. Two of the basic objectives of the state rehabilitation program were stated
by the court to be: (1) to provide modem education and training for rehabilitation
of patients and prisoners to useful citizenship, and (2) to achieve the highest degree
of systematic and economic management.
28. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
29. Id. at 128 (quoted by the circuit court with emphasis placed on "being in a
marketable condition" and overhanging the market).
30. The court's finding that the contention is conjectural is based on the supposition that the Ohio Legislature would not necessarily appropriate funds to purchase
wheat to replace that which the federal government would not allow to be grown.
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capacity. In substance, this court accepted the argument rejected
in Case:
The argument that the Act should not be construed so as to include a State
within the enumerated list made subject to price regulation, rests largely
on the premise that Congress does not ordinarily attempt to regulate state
activities and that we should not infer such an intention in the absence of
plain and unequivocal language. 3 '

It clearly appears that such a rule of construction is out of line with
authority. Whenever an act of Congress is all-embracing in its scope
and national in its purpose, and whenever that purpose may be
obstructed by state actions as well as by individual action, a state
will not be presumed to be exempt.- Thus, it seems that the appropriate question is not "does the federal purpose interfere with the
State function?", but "does the chosen means of carrying out the
State function interfere with the federal purpose?" In Case, the
Supreme Court said:
Excessive prices for rents or commodities charged by a State or its agencies

would produce exactly the same conditions as would be produced were
these prices charged by other persons. We, therefore, have no doubt that

Congress intended the Act to apply generally to sales of commodities by
States.m3

The same reasoning is applicable to the instant case. As stated in
Filburn, "one of the primary purposes of the Act... was to increase
the market price of wheat and.., to limit the volume thereof that
could affect the market."4 The consumption of the excess wheat by
the state would produce exactly the same effect as would be produced were the wheat to be raised and consumed by an individual
farmer. As found in Filburn, the home-consumed wheat would
have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing the purpose
of Congress to stimulate trade at increased prices. It follows that
the expressed congressional purpose in enacting the Agricultural
Adjustment Act must control the effect given to the statutory language.
Section 1340(3) of the act 35 provides that the "farm marketing
excess shall be regarded as available for marketing," and that the
penalty shall be imposed upon this excess wheat. To avoid imposing
the penalty, the circuit court found that the Ohio Constitution prohibited the state-grown wheat from being "available for marketing."
Such construction assumes "available" to mean "subject to unrestricted
31. Case v. Bowles, supra note 23, at 99.
32. United States v. California, supra note 22.
33. Case v. Bowles, supra note 23, at 100.
34. Wickard v. Filburn, supra note 4.
35. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31. as amended, 7 U.S.C.
§ 1340(3) (1964).
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disposition" rather than "fit for use." The former meaning, however,
is inconsistent with the expressed purpose of the act and with the
reasoning of Filburn; under such a construction so long as a farmer
placed restrictions upon the marketing of the wheat (e.g., by contract), he could produce unlimited amounts for home-consumption.
The Supreme Court's interchangeable usage of "marketable condition" with "available for marketing" confirms that excess wheat is
"available" if "fit" for marketing. Defining "available" as "fit for use"
is consistent with the congressional intent to regulate total supply
and thereby increase farm income.
The congressional policy finds support in economic principles. By
regulating total supply, Congress can induce a rise in the price paid
for wheat, which, because of the peculiar characteristics of agricultural
demand, will ultimately produce an increase in total farm revenue.
It is axiomatic that the price of a product is determined by the
intersection of its aggregate supply and demand functions. The
demand function reflects the amounts of the product that will be
demanded at various prices; the supply function reflects the amounts
of the product that will be supplied at various prices. Where the two
functions intersect, i.e., coincide, a price is reached at which consumers will buy the total quantity that producers are willing to
supply. In this way, market price is determined. A change in either
of these functions will produce a different price level. However,
variations in total revenue depend upon the responsiveness of the
demand function to changes in price. In the case of wheat, the demand function is generally recognized to be inelastic.36 Therefore, a
relatively small decrease in total quantity supplied will produce a
relatively large increase in price. The result is an increase in total
revenue to the producers. Conversely, because of these same factors,
a relatively small increase in supply will result in diminished farm
revenue. From this economic vantage point, it is seen that by increasing total supply the production of excess wheat by a state will
reduce total farm income. The circuit court, however, holds that this
effect will not be produced because it is conjectural that the state's
demand will be satisfied by purchasing from the non-state produced
supply. In other words, this court does not consider the state's production and demand to be part of the total supply and total demand. This
position fails to take into account present-day knowledge of market
determination of prices. If the state could produce no wheat, or
36. SA UmSON, ECONOMICS, AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYsIs at 403 (6th ed. 1964).
Inelasticity of demand refers to the relative insensitivity of change in quantity
demanded in response to a price change. Since consumption of agricultural products
in the United States depends more on the capacity of the stomach than on the capacity
of the wallet, price changes have little impact on the quantity demanded.
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only a reduced amount, it would most surely resort to the outside
supply to satisfy its demand. Purchasing all or part of its needs from
the market will, of course, mean that the cost of wheat will be
greater than before. Since the demand for food products is inelastic,
however, higher price should not deter the Ohio Legislature from
purchasing wheat to replace that which the federal government will
not allow to be grown.

Corporations-Dissolution of Close Corporation
Not Granted On Mere Showing of Low Profits
Insufficient To Provide Minority Shareholder
With Adequate Return on Invested Capital
Plaintiffs, minority shareholders, owed 46 per cent of the common
stock and 50 per cent of the preferred stock, of a retail lumber company all of which had been inherited from an original incorporator of
the business.1 Defendant, one of the original incorporators and
presently chairman of the board of directors, held 53 per cent of the
common stock and 50 per cent of the preferred stock.2 The corporation employed defendant as its president, and as compensation he
received a base salary plus a bonus at the end of each year. His
total compensation averaged around 15,000 dollars per year, for the
years 1958 to 1961 inclusive.3 The company had five additional
employees with total yearly salaries of about 35,000 dollars. Annual
sales averaged 260,000 dollars. After corporate taxes and salaries,
however, net income has averaged about 1,260 dollars per year since
1. The business was incorporated in 1924, with $5300 in capital and 100 shares
common stock and 320 shares preferred stock authorized. Both common and preferred
had a par value of $100, and as the business grew, these shares were issued to
Kruger and Gerth in proportion to their original contribution. At the time of this
action all shares had been issued. Mr. Kruger had retired from the business in 1950
because of ill health, but had continued to receive a small salary from the corporation.
Brief for Appellee, appendix A, Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 803, 210 N.E.2d 355,
263 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965).
2. The remaining common share was held by defendant's brother, who was also a
member of the board of directors.
3. Gerth's salaries and bonuses for these years were as follows:
Total
Bonus
Salary
Year
$14,827.20
$5,827.20
$9,000.00
1958
16,153.24
7,153.20
9,000.04
1959
15,480.00
6,480.00
9,000.00
1960
15,495.64
6,120.00
9,374.64
1961
The above figures were taken from the Brief for Appellee, Appendix A.
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1958. 4 This sum represented a return of only 1.04 per cent on invested
capital of 115,000 dollars. It was shown that the corporation had
never paid a common stock dividend, and had paid only four dividends
on its preferred stock.5 Testimony at the trial also evidenced that it
was very doubtful whether the corporation would ever be able to earn
more than one to two per cent on invested capital after business
expenses and reasonable salaries were paid. Plaintiffs admitted that
the defendant's compensation might be considered reasonable in view
of services rendered.6 They contended, however, that the court should
exercise its power to dissolve the corporation on the ground that its
existence was continued for the sole benefit of the majority shareholder
by providing him with employment at the expense of the minority
shareholders who would never receive a fair return on their capital
investment. Defendant maintained that dissolution would be improper
since no fraud, mismanagement, or looting of corporate assets was
alleged by plaintiffs, and no violation of any fiduciary duty owed
plaintiff by defendants had been shown. The trial court entered
judgment for plaintiffs; the appellate division reversed.7 On appeal
the New York Court of Appeals, held, affirmned. Dissolution of a close
corporation will not be granted where the only showing is that, after
reasonable salaries and bonuses, profits are too low to provide a
minority shareholder with an adequate return on his invested capital.8
Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 210 N.E.2d 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1965).
Historically a court of equity was without power to order the
involuntary dissolution of a solvent corporation in the absence of
4. The corporation's profit after tax, dividends paid, surplus, and surplus plus capital
is shown below.
Surplus + Capital
Surplus
Profit
Dividends
Year
$110,480.21
$68,480.21
$7,405.91
$ -01955
116,565.51
74,565.51
6,204.30
-01956
121,655.43
79,655.43
5,089.92
-01957
121,138.69
79,138.69
1,189.90
1,706.64
1958
120,017.28
78,017.28
1,438.55
2,559.96
1959
118,746.30
76,746.30
1,288.98
2,559.96
1960
117,435.97
75,435.97
1,249.63
2,559.96
1961
The above figures are from Brief for Appellee, appendix A, Kruger v. Gerth, supra
note 1.
5. It should be noted that part of the dividend paid the preferred stockholders in
1958 thru 1961 was from accumulated surplus. The preferred was 8% cumulative;
however all dividends prior to 1958 had been cancelled by an agreement between
Kruger and Gerth, the only holders of the stock.
6. This admission was for the purpose of this appeal only. Plaintiffs' second and
third causes of action relating to the excessiveness of salaries and bonuses paid to
Gerth and two other employees were dismissed at the trial for lack of proof. Reply
Brief for Appellant, pp. 2-3, Kruger v. Gerth, supra note 1.
7. Kruger v. Gerth, 22 App. Div. 2d 916, 255 N.Y.S.2d 498 (2d Dep't 1964).
8. The Court of Appeals adopted the opinion of the Appellate Division. Ibid.
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statute.' The rationale was that a corporation owed its existence to a
grant from the sovereign and could be dissolved only by his decree.,
However, as the source of corporate existence evolved from special
charters to present, general statutory authorization, both the courts
and legislatures began to provide for involuntary dissolution under
appropriate circumstances." This form of relief, by reason of its
drastic nature, was usually granted only in cases of managerial deadlock, shareholder dissension frustrating the corporate purpose, directors' fraud, or gross abuse of managerial discretion.12
New York has given its courts the power to allow voluntary dissolu-

tion of a corporation in specified circumstances. 13 The courts, however,

have superimposed a "good faith" requirement on this legislative
grant of power to a majority of the directors or shareholders to petition
the court for voluntary dissolution. This good faith requirement was
first recognized in Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co.'4 In that
case a minority shareholder sought to enjoin the dissolution of the
corporation by a majority of the board, which was composed of majority shareholders. Sustaining the injunction, the court stated that the

dissolution would be detrimental to minority shareholders and did

9. LA-rir, CORPORATONS 556-58 (1959); 2 O'Nr-AL, CLOSE CORPORA-IONS § 9.27,
at 224 (1958).
10. Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse-judicial Power to Wind Up a
Corporationat the Suit of a Minority Shareholder, 40 COLum. L. REv. 219, 223 (1940).
11. 2 O'Neal, op. cit. supra note 9, at 226-27. Statutes in many states permit dissolution by court decree in cases of deadlock and dissension. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §
157.86 (Smith-Hurd 1954), provides:
Courts of equity shall have full power to liquidate the assets and business of a
corporation:
(a) In an action by a shareholder when it is made to appear:
(1) That the directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs
and the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and that irreparable injury
to the corporation is being suffered or is threatened by reason thereof; or
(2) That the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, and have failed, for
a period which includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect
successors to directors whose term has expired or would have expired upon the
election of their successors; or
(3) That the acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation are
illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent; or
(4)That the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.
This is one of the most comprehensive of this type of statute. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 1104; N.C. Gr. STAT. § 55-125 (1965), for similar provisions.
12. Either by express statutory authority or by recognized exceptions to the general
rule, the majority of jurisdictions now recognize the power of equity to dissolve a
corporation under one or more of these circumstances. 2 O'NRAL, op. cit. supra note
9, at 228.
13. N.Y. Bus. CoaP. LAw § 110, provides for voluntary dissolution "If a majority
of the board adopts a resolution that finds that the assets of a corporation are not
sufficient to discharge its liabilities or that a dissolution will be beneficial to the shareholders, it may present a petition for its dissolution." Section 1103 provides for the
same procedure to be exercised by majority shareholders.
14. 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919).
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not represent the unbiased, good faith judgment of the directors. In
Kroger v. Jarburg,15 the court held that this "good faith" duty might
also be violated by a refusal of the board to petition the court for
dissolution. The allegations were that the business was obsolete;
that it was and always had been unprofitable; and that the remaining
assets were being consumed by the president, and dominant shareholder, of the corporation by his taking exorbitant salaries. Under
these circumstances the court stated: "Bad faith and fraud in refraining from dissolving a corporation may be shown to be as much a
breach of duty as bad faith and fraud in seeking wrongfully to dissolve a corporation."' 16 Thus, the good faith requirement in the
exercise of the statutory voluntary dissolution power evolved into a
separate ground for involuntary dissolution of a solvent corporation,
wholly apart from the New York statute allowing involuntary dissolution only in cases of managerial deadlock.17
In Fontheim v. Walker, 8 the court began to define the limits of a
minority shareholder's action for involuntary dissolution; it was held
that wrongful conduct necessary for involuntary dissolution was
greater than that required for a shareholder's derivative suit to
enjoin waste, and that the interests of all shareholders are to be
considered. The requisite elements of an action by a minority
shareholder for involuntary dissolution were set forth in Gross v.
Price.19 The shareholder must allege either that capital was being
impaired by a looting of the assets of the corporation or that the
corporate existence was continued for the sole benefit of those in
control. In reaffirming these principles, Leibert v. Clapp20 made it
clear that neither profitable operation nor availability of derivative
relief were bars to the action for dissolution. Leibert also explained
the rationale for the court's granting dissolution in the above situations. By either looting the corporation or maintaining its existence
for their sole benefit, the majority in control breached their good
faith duty to the minority shareholders, and, since their judgment
15. 231 App. Div. 641, 248 N.Y.S. 387 (1st Dep't 1931).
16. Id. at 645, 248 N.Y.S. at 392.
17. N.Y. Bus. Conp. LAW § 1104, provides that the holders of 50% of all outstanding
shares may present a petition for dissolution in case of deadlock of the board of directors, dissension among shareholders to the extent that they are unable to elect directors,
or internal dissension among shareholders' groups so severe as to make dissolution
beneficial to all shareholders. Section 1104(c) provides that a shareholder of less than
50% of the outstanding shares may bring suit only when the shareholders are so
divided as to be unable to elect successor directors for a period of tvo consecutive
annual meetings. The statutory right of minority shareholders to force or petition for
involuntary dissolution thus appears to be very limited in New York.
18. 282 App. Div. 373, 122 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1st Dep't 1953).
19. 284 App. Div. 964, 134 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d Dep't 1954).
20. 13 N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1963).
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was warped by their own interests, they were no longer qualified to
make decisions concerning voluntary dissolution. Thus, a decisional
21
vacuum was created within the corporation for the courts to fill.
Unfortunately, the New York courts have failed to state what allegations of fact must be proven to bring one under the standard stated
3
in Gross22 and Leibert.2
Some writers, and a few courts, have suggested that shareholders
in a close corporation should be treated as partners inter sese.2
Although not completely descriptive of its characteristics, a close
corporation may be generally defined as a corporation which has
relatively few shareholders, and in which ownership and management
are identical to the extent that independent judgment of the directors
is, in fact, a fiction.2 The suggestion that shareholders in such a corporation be treated as partners inter sese was primarily triggered by the
courts' failure to recognize any difference between the publicly held
corporation and the close corporation in applying strict corporate norm
requirements to both. It was argued that since ownership and management of a close corporation were identical, there was no inherent
reason why shareholders could not regulate their relationship among
themselves as they saw fit-regardless of some general corporate law
requirements applicable for the protection of shareholders in the
publicly held corporation. 26 This failure to distinguish close corporations from publicly held corporations led courts to invalidate shareholder agreements made to insure that they would not be "squeezed
out" of a corporation by the operation of the principle of majority
control.-' Courts found that these agreements frequently impinged
upon the statutory power of the board of directors to manage the
21. Id. at 315, 196 N.E.2d at 543, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
22. Supra note 19.
23. Supra note 20.
24. Conway, The New York Fiduciary Concept in Incorporated Partnerships and
Joint Ventures, 30 FoRDHAm L. REv. 297 (1961). Some writers would treat shareholders in close corporations as partners inter sese, but would resort to a Close Corporation Act to do so. See Winer, Proposing A New York "Close Corporation Law," 28
CORNELL L.Q. 313 (1942), and comments on the advisability of such a law in
Symposium-The Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 345, 397 (1957). Examples
of courts treating shareholders in close corporations as partners inter sese are: Flemming
v. Heffner & Flemming, 263 Mich. 561, 248 N.W. 900 (1933); Green v. National
Advertising & Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65, 162 N.W. 1056 (1917).
25. Isreals, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existenwes: Problems of Deadlock and
Dissolution, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 778 (1952).
26. Isreals, supra note 25; Comment, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 514 (1955).
27. "Squeeze-outs" may be defined as "the use by some of the owners or participants
in a business enterprise of strategic position, inside information, or powers of control,
or the utilization of some legal device or technique, to eliminate from the enterprise
one or more of its owners or participants." O'NEAI & DEawnr, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSIrsS AssOcrATEs 3 (1961).
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corporation.28 As a result of judicial inertia in this area, many states
enacted statutes authorizing such agreements.29 Nevertheless, some

writers remain dissatisfied with this limited recognition of the peculiar

nature of the close corporation. 30 They maintain that if shareholders
of these corporations were viewed as partners inter sese, the courts-

even in the absence of shareholder agreements or statutes-would
have a basis apart from the corporate law with which to protect the
minority interest.31 In effect, shareholders would be cast in a dual
role. They would be shareholders as to all strangers but partners
among themselves. As partners, they would be held to a much
higher degree of fiduciary responsibility one to the other due to the
32

personal and consensual nature of the partnership relationship.

Partners may force dissolution of a partnership at will, and the

courts will uphold the dissolution, but the wrongfully dissolving

partner may have to respond in damages to the others. 33 It is

maintained that treatment in this manner would be more in line
with the intended relationship of the shareholders and would be
beneficial to the entire business community.34 Investors, no longer
fearing the possibility of "squeeze-out," would be more willing to

risk their capital in the small venture. Moreover, prolonged dissension, inaction, and the resulting "locking-in" of capital, results in

greater loss to the economy than does dissolution and the accompanying freeing of capital for other enterprises.5 However, in the absence
28. E.g., Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945)
(holding a shareholders agreement requiring unanimity for directorial action void).
29. N.C. G~m. STAT. § 55-73 (1965); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 620. Most other
states have similar provisions, although they vary slightly from state to state. Theoretically, these states are for all corporations, but practically they affect only close corporations since they are the only ones which can muster the necessary unanimous consent to
place such agreements into effect.
30. O'NEAL & DF.wiN, op. cit. supra note 27, at 209-16; Isreals, supra note 25, at
792-93. O'Neal maintains that American courts have been singularly unimaginative in
protecting the minority shareholder by remedies short of dissolution in the "squeezeout" situation. While not urging that shareholders in close corporations be treated as
partners inter sese, he does urge that the problem should be alleviated either by statute
or by the judiciary development of more flexible remedies.
31. Isreals, supra note 25, at 794-95. Isreals urges that shareholders in a close
corporation be treated as partners or joint venturers to achieve flexibility of remedy
when such remedy would not be available under the corporate law.
32. O'NnA- & DERwvN, op. cit. supra note 27, at 144-45.
33. Uarom PARTmEsHiI AcT § 31(2), provides that a partnership may be dissolved "in contravention of the agreement between the partners, where the circumstances do not permit a dissolution under any other provision of this section, by the
express will of any partner at any time." However, if such dissolution is forced the
wrongfully dissolving partner may be required to pay damages under § 38(2) of the
U.P.A. Section 32 also gives the courts broad powers to dissolve a partnership on
the application of any partner when circumstances render a dissolution equitable.
34. O'Neal, Protecting Minority Shareholders Against "Squeeze-Outs," 43 NEn. L.
REv. 382, 385 (1964).
35. Winer, supra note 24, at 332-33.
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of specific statutes or collateral agreements 36 the courts generally have
refused to regard shareholders of close corporation as partners inter
sese.'

The majority- 8 recognized the duty of the directors and majority
shareholders to act in good faith as to a minority request for dissolution, and applied the standards set out in Gross9 and Liebert4° to
determine whether this duty had been breached. Since the evidence
did not sustain plaintiffs' contention that the compensation paid to
defendant was excessive, the court felt all that was shown was that
reasonable compensation to defendant and other employees had
reduced profits to such an extent as to provide plaintiffs with an
inadequate return on their capital. 4' The majority of the court would
not direct dissolution on such meager evidence. The plaintiffs failed
to carry the necessary burden of proving that the corporate existence
was maintained solely for the benefit of the majority at the expense of
the minority. Justice Desmond dissented on the ground that plaintiffs
had adequately established that the corporation was maintained for
the sole benefit of the defendant-there was no expectation that
business would ever improve to the point that the minority shareholders could receive a fair return on their capital investment. Thus,
the defendant would receive benefits from his continued employment
while enjoying the practically free use of plaintiff's capital.4 The
corporation should, therefore, be dissolved under the Leibert 3 rule.
Judge Fuld, in his dissent, rejected the Leibert approach to adjudications among shareholders of close corporations. Reasoning by
44
analogy to the New York statutes validating shareholder agreements
aimed at the "squeeze-out" problem and to decisions preserving the
36. By "collateral agreement" is meant a previous agreement between parties to
become partners or joint venturers. As an incident to this agreement a corporation is

formed. Thus, if X, Y, and Z agreed to become joint venturers to develop a tract of
land and to incorporate pursuant to this plan, they would have a collateral joint

venture agreement.
37. Where there has been a collateral agreement the majority of the courts have

treated the shareholders as joint venturers and have imposed the accompanying fiduciary
responsibilities upon them. In effect, the responsibilities "carry over" into the incorporation. However, where there is no collateral agreement, the courts have generally

refused to treat shareholders in close corporations as partners solely because of the
nature of the close corporation. See Hennessey v. During, 124, N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup.
Ct. 1953); Freedman v. Fox, 67 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1953).
38. See note 7 supra.
39. Supra note 19.
40. Supra note 20.
41. Kruger v. Gerth, supra note 7 at 919, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 500-01.

42. Kruger v. Gerth, supra note 1, at 802, 803, 210 N.E.2d at 355, 356, 263 N.Y.S.2d
at 1, 2.
43. Supra note 20.
44. N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAw § 620.
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trust relationship between incorporated joint venturers,4 5 he concluded that shareholders in close corporations should be treated as
partners inter sese. This would preserve the intended relationship
between the parties by providing the shareholder with a basis for
relief outside that available to him in his corporate role as shareholder.46 Dissolution could thus be declared when such would be
the right of a partner or joint venturer. If the court possessed this
liberal power to dissolve a close corporation beyond that provided by
the general corporate law, it would then be free to work out suitable
remedies considering all the facts of a case. In short, the court could
tailor the remedy to fit the facts. 47 In the instant case Judge Fuld
suggested that the other shareholders purchase the complaining
shareholders' interest at a court fixed price or face dissolution.
The dilemma facing the court in the instant case was as follows:
On the one hand, plaintiffs have their capital "locked into" the
enterprise because of the extremely limited market for the minority
interest in a close corporation. 48 They are forced to leave their investment in the business-funds which they may need for a variety of
personal reasons. Coupled with this consideration is the questionable
economic policy of decreasing the mobility of capital and keeping it
within the marginal enterprise. On the other hand there are the
defendants' equities: (1) Both defendant and the deceased shareholder were equally unwise in not planning for this contingency by
the use of buy-sell agreements. 49 (2) Dissolution would force a higher
capital gains tax on defendant, who has not had the benefit of "stepped
45. DeBoy v. Harris 207 Md. 212, 113 A.2d 903 (1955) (three persons entered into
agreement to develop land for warehouse purposes and to form a corporation for such
purpose. After incorporation the majority of 2 attempted to "squeeze-out" the third by
issuing more stock than the one was able to purchase.); La Varre v. Hall, 42 F.2d
65 (5th Cir. 1930) (partnership formed to operate a group of newspapers which
were incorporated. One of the partners held the stock of certain newspapers in his
name and attempted to prevent the other partner from participating in the profits of
newspapers in which he held the stock). A joint venture may be defined as a
partnership with a specific purpose. Courts if they viewed shareholders as joint
venturers may be defined as a partnership with a specific purpose. Courts if they
viewed shareholders as joint venturers inter sese, would cast them in dual roles, with
a separate body of law that would be applicable to each role, i.e., corporate to shareholders role, and partnerships to joint venturers role.
46. Isreals, supra note 25.
47. Kruger v. Gerth, supra note 1, at 804, 210 N.E.2d at 357, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
48. It is hard to overemphasize this basic difference between the shareholders of a
close corporation and those of a public corporation. Often, even if a buyer may be
found, his offer will be far below even the book-value of the shares because of the
inherent personal difficulties of small enterprises.
49. For a discussion of various buy-sell and survivorship arrangements see Strecker,
Corporate Buy-Sell Agreements: Tax Problems in Drafting, 15 WAsH. & LEE L. Rlv.
18 (1958).
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up basis"50 under the tax law as have plaintiffs. (3) Dissolution in
order to permit a deceased shareholder's heirs to extract their capital
would defeat the basic corporate attribute of continued existence-an
attribute that is basic in the layman's expectations concerning the
corporate entity. (4) To force a man, who is elderly and has committed no wrongful acts, to dissolve a business which he has operated
for forty years is not in accord with our notions of fairness.
Viewing the opinion, it is apparent that the majority is in accord
with the great weight of authority, and under these facts the decision
seems just. However, this conclusion was predicated upon the fact
that the alternative course provided by law was too drastic; there was
no middle ground. The shareholder under present law could receive
either dissolution or nothing. While it was not stated, the majority
decided that if there must be unfairness, it is better to be unfair to
the minority. The most obvious solution to this problem is through
advance planning, preferably at the time of incorporation, for some
type of buy-sell arrangement to protect all shareholders. In the
absence of a plan, however, there appears to be a weakness in the
law that forces the minority shareholder to accept meager returns
because there is no market for his shares and no remedy, short of
dissolution, by which he may retrieve his capital from the enterprise.
To some extent, the problem may be solving itself by the natural
processes of growth, merger and consolidation by which corporations
become publicly held and their shares become more easily marketable.
Also, to the degree that present day attorneys have become more
aware of the problems of doing business in the close corporate form
and consider such difficulties when advising clients, the problem is
lessened. But these processes still leave the many shareholders in small
corporations which were incorporated without adequate agreements
and which have not grown into public corporations "locked into" their
enterprise. In these circumstances "flexibility of remedy, tailored to
all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the good faith
of the parties on both sides, their conflicting interests and motivations,
if any, is the key."51 Several writers have noted the problem of
lack of available remedies and have suggested that the law be
broadened in this regard; 52 the problem, however, is how this is to be
done. Are the courts to be left slowly to develop an independent
basis of liability by treatment of the shareholder in close corporations
in a dual capacity, thus providing remedies available under partner50. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1014, provides that the basis of property acquired

from decedent shall be the value at the date of death.
51. Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 805, 210 N.E.2d 355, 357, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3
(1965) (dissenting opinion).
52. O'NEAL & DERWiN, op. cit. supranote 27, at 191-218; Isreals, supra note 25.
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ship law? Or, would it be more desirable that legislatures make some
attempt to define a close corporation and provide courts with standards and remedies necessary to handle these cases satisfactorily?
It would appear that the legislature should act in this area for
several reasons: (1) To cast the shareholder in a dual role for purposes
of dissolution would create confusion in the law and perhaps bring in
a great deal of law inappropriate to the corporate context.5 3 (2) The
partnership analogy is not very sound-especially in regard to widows
and heirs of deceased shareholders. Partners have the right to choose
their business associates, but the shareholder does not-these heirs
could not really be considered partners since the element of choice
is absent. (3) Legislative definition and standards would place more
certainty in the law in a commercial area where certainty is highly
desirable.
Section 210 of the English Companies Act of 194854 represents a
legislative attempt to provide remedies in cases similar to the one
under discussion. Under the act a court could make such orders as
it saw fit, including purchase of the shares by the other shareholders
or the company, and regulation of company affairs in the future.
However, because the standard for application of the act was tied
closely with the standard for "winding up," little relief has been
granted under it. It is difficult to convince an English Court that the
winding up of a corporation is "just and equitable."5 5 Ithas been
suggested that section 210 be modified to separate the requirements
for a cause of action under its provisions from the requirements of a
cause of action for "winding up." The shareholder would need to
show only that the corporate powers were being exercised "in a
manner oppressive to him" or "in disregard of . . . his interests"
53. Would partnership rules regarding priority in distribution of assets be appropriate,
for instance?
54. Section 210 provides as follows: (1) Any member of a company who complains
that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to some
part of the members . . . may make an application to the court by petition for an
order under this section. (2)If on any such petition the court is of the opinion (a)
that the company's affairs are being conducted as aforesaid; and (b) that to wind up
the company would unfairly prejudice that part of the members, but otherwise the facts
would justify the making of a winding up order on the ground that it was just and
equitable that the company should be wound up. The court may, with a view to
bringing to an end the matters complained of, making such order as it sees fit, either
for the purpose of regulating the conduct of the company's future affairs, or for the
purchase of the shares of any members of the company by other members of the
company and in the case of a purchase by the company, for the reduction accordingly
of the company's capital, or otherwise. Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c.38, §
210.
55. O'N L & DERwin, op. cit. supra note 27, at 185.
56. Government of Northern Ireland, Report of the Departmental Committee on
Company Law Amendment, Cmd. 393, pp. 6-7, 10-12, as reprinted in part. Corp.
Prac. Commentator, Feb. 1960, 33-38.
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in order to state a cause for relief.5 7 The courts could then hear the
case and arrive at an equitable result using the broad relief powers
granted under the act. This writer feels that such legislative action
should be attempted in this country, granting courts great latitude
in providing a remedy, with perhaps the only required showing for
relief being "unfairness under all the circumstances."
Criminal Law-illegal Searches

and Seizures-Extension of
the "Open Door" Rule
Defendant was convicted in a New York state court for possession
of heroin. At the trial, the government conceded that the evidence
of possession was obtained during an illegal search. While the trial
court did not allow evidence of the search to be admitted directly,'
it did admit such evidence indirectly as a result of the following
exchange. On direct examination, the prosecutor questioned a police
officer in regard to the search of the accused's apartment, asking, "did
you find anything"; he received an affirmative answer. On crossexamination, the defense counsel attempted to erase the inference
left by that answer by inquiring whether the search had in fact yielded
narcotics. The officer replied that no narcotics had been found. On
redirect examination, the prosecutor, over defense counsel's objections,
elicited from the witness that certain instruments, which are generally
used in the processing of heroin, had been found during the illegal
search. The trial court ruled that defense counsers questions concerning the nature of the found articles had "opened the door" to
further questioning by the prosecution about the fruits of the search;
and the prosecutor's inquiries on redirect examination were therefore
justified. Alleging that the admission of this testimony was a violation
of his constitutional rights under the rule of Mapp v. Ohio,2 defendant
petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus. The
district court denied the petition, and the Court of Appeals for the
57. Subsections (a) and (b) above would be amended to read as follows: (2) If
on such application the court is of opinion that the company's affairs are being conducted or the powers of the directors are being exercised as aforesaid, the court may,
with a view to bringing to an end the matters complained of, make such order as it
thinks fit. . . . Supra note 55 at 37. Thus, the link to "winding up" and "just and
equitable" would be deleted.
1. In an earlier trial, the State's attempt to introduce evidence concerning the illegal
search resulted in the trial judge's declaring a mistrial.
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp declared all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the federal constitution to be inadmissible in both state and
federal courts.
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Second Circuit held, affirmed. Where admissibility of evidence turns
upon the interpretation of a state procedural rule, federal courts, on
collateral attack, will not overturn a conviction unless the application
results in a "fundamental unfairness" to the accused. United States ex
rel. Castillo v. Fay, 350 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1965).
Mapp v. Ohio was the culmination of a series of cases concerned
with the admission of evidence obtained during illegal searches.
Initially, in Weeks v. United States,3 the Supreme Court held that the
fourth amendment 4 barred federal courts from using evidence obtained
through an illegal search. This exclusion was deemed an essential
part of the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures because of the deterrent effect it would have
upon illegal police conduct. In the same case, however, the Court
specifically held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not make the fourth amendment prohibitions applicable to
the states. 5 In a later decision, however, Wolf v. Colorado,6 the
Supreme Court viewed the fourth amendment guarantees as within
those "liberties" which the fourteenth amendment made binding upon
the states.7 Nonetheless, it rejected the idea that the exclusionary rule
was such an essential part of the fourth amendment that it also had
to be followed by the states. Not wishing to override relevant state
rules of evidence, and relying upon other available means to protect
the right of privacy,8 the Court indicated that the states should be
given adequate opportunity to adopt or reject the exclusionary rule.
In Mapp, the Supreme Court declared the reasoning of Wolf to be
no longer valid.9 Instead, it held that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the federal constitution was in3. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
U.S.
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .......
CONST. amend. IV.
5. Supra note 3, at 398; see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937).
6. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
7. The Supreme Court had restricted the operation of the fourteenth amendment to
only those rights which were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko, stipra
note 5, at 325. The Court, in Wolf, declared the right of privacy to be essential to
ordered liberty, and; as such, enforceable against the states through due process.
Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 6, at 27-29.
8. In Wolf, the Court emphasized that at the time of its decision, thirty-one states
had refused to apply the exclusionary rule of Weeks. The jurisdictions which had
rejected Weeks relied upon other means of protecting an individual's right to privacy.
Criminal sanctions such as a suit for damages or a prosecution for oppression were
available to deter trespassing police officers. The Court felt that, if consistently
enforced, these remedies would be as effective as the exclusionary rule. Wolf also
stressed that public opinion condemning oppressive police conduct was an effective
protection for the right of privacy. Supra note 6, at 29-31.
9. In 1949, prior to the Wolf decision, almost two-thirds of the states were opposed
to the use of the exclusionary rule stated in Weeks. The Mapp Court emphasized that
by 1961 more than half of those states had, either by legislation or judicial decision,
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admissible in both state and federal courts. The purpose of the Mapp
rule is to deter law enforcement agencies from infringing upon an
individual's right of privacy through unlawful searches and seizures.
Thus, the exclusionary rule is not a rule of evidence, but rather a rule
of law "proved by experience to be expedient."' 0
Testimony concerning illegally obtained evidence may, however, be
admitted by courts when it is found that the accused has waived
his objection to such testimony." This "open door" rule has been
applied 12 where the accused voluntarily introduces testimony concerning illegal evidence. In such situations, the rule permits the
prosecution to utilize otherwise inadmissible evidence to discredit
the defendant's testimony. 3 However, the extent to which that evidence may be used for impeachment purposes has been strictly
limited. As stated in United States v. Beno,' 4 it should go only to
counter any advantage the accused has obtained through his reference
to the evidence. The prosecution will be restrained from fully
exploiting the illegal evidence. "In short, a small advantage improperly obtained does not compel the exaction of a gross disadvantage in penalty, particularly where a tarnished verdict is the in5
evitable result."'
In the instant case, the majority affirmed the district court's denial
of a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of the state court's determination that petitioner had "opened the door." While conceding that
wholly or partly adopted the Weeks rule. The Court also characterized the other
means utilized by state courts to protect the right of privacy, as "worthless and
futile." Supra note 2, at 651-52.
10. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113 (1908).
11. See generally 1 WiGMOPr, EvnFNCE § 15 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1964).
12, Before the Mapp decision, evidence obtained from an illegal search was ad-

missible in state courts, and thus the accused had no objection to waive. Because
Mapp was so recently decided, state courts have, as yet, seldom been confronted with

the waiver rule; and federal courts have not been called upon to review a state's
determination on waiver.
13. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1953); Agnello v. United States, 269

U.S. 20 (1925); United States v. Rivera, 346 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1965). In WaIder,
the accused was charged with possession of narcotics. He testified on direct examination that he had never purchased, sold or possessed narcotics. The prosecutor brought
in evidence to prove that the accused had possessed narcotics. The trial judge carefully charged the jury that the prosecutor's use of evidence from an illegal search went
solely to impeachment of the accused's testimony. 347 U.S. at 64. In Rivera the accused
testified concerning the general content of an interrogation of him by an assistant

United States attorney, implying that it proved his innocence. The prosecution was
permitted to introduce in rebuttal the transcript of the interrogation. 346 F.2d at 943.

In Agnello the government was denied the use of the "open door" rule. Here, the defendant was asked the very broad question of whether he had ever seen narcotics.
After eliciting the expected denial, the government sought to introduce evidence of
narcotics located in the defendant's home. The Court ruled that the defendant had
done nothing to waive his constitutional rights. 269 U.S. at 35.

14. 324 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1963).
15. Id. at 588-89.
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admissibility of the testimony here was an extremely close question,
it concluded that the testimony did not reach the constitutional
proportions of unfairness required for the granting of habeas corpus
to the accused. Even though it is the duty of the federal courts to
vindicate federal constitutional rights by habeas corpus relief, the
court felt that a state procedure administering those rights should
not be upset unless it is so "fundamentally unfair" as to undermine
federal guarantees. The majority emphasized that at the time the
prosecution introduced evidence of the search, Mapp had not yet
been decided.' 6 To the court this meant that the prosecution had
not knowingly attempted to infringe upon the defendant's constitutional rights. At best, the admission of this evidence was but a
mere technical error of local trial procedure, and thus it was not so
prejudicial as to require reversal. Furthermore, the majority believed
that the purpose of the Mapp rule would not be served in the instant
case; law enforcement agencies would not be deterred where admissability depended upon such a close determination of state procedure.
The dissent stressed that the prosecutor had been warned at an
earlier trial against the use of evidence relating to the search, 7 and
thus knew the evidence to be inadmissible. It could not agree that
the accused had "opened the door," for the defendant testified about
the search only after the prosecutor's initial reference. Therefore,
the dissent felt that the traditional rules of waiver, allowing the admission of illegally obtained evidence in rebuttal, were not applicable
here.
Unless strictly limited to state prosecutions occurring prior to the
Mapp decision,'18 the test utilized in the instant case may result in a
serious inroad upon the protection from unreasonable searches which
Mapp affords. The court felt that in order for a federal court to overturn a state conviction resulting from the application of state rules,
there must be "fundamental unfairness" to the accused. Heretofore,
federal courts have employed a strict standard in determining the
extent to which illegally seized evidence is admissible under the "open
door" rule. In the instant case, however, the court employed this
different standard to determine admissibility because it was reviewing
a state court proceeding rather than a federal one. The application
of this new standard raises the question: when will a state court
16. The accused's trial occurred in April, 1961; Mapp was not decided until June,
1961.
17. The trial judge characterized the prosecutor's attempt to bring up the search as
"irrelevant, inflammatory and prejudicial." 350 F.2d at 406.
18. At the time the prosecutor referred to the illegal search evidence, Mapp had not
been decided. The Mapp rule is only applicable to the instant case because the final
decision of the accused's appeal postdated the decision in Mapp. After this decision,
however, all prosecutions subsequent to 1961 will be charged with constructive
knowledge of the rule of law formulated in Mapp.
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interpretation of a procedural rule become "fundamentally unfair"?
The answer depends largely upon the trial tactics of the prosecutor.
If his tactics are subtle, the state court's determination of waiver will
be more difficult to overturn on review by a federal court than it will
be if his tactics are flagrant. Yet, whether the prosecution is flagrant
or subtle, the end result is the admission of illegally obtained evidence
seriously detrimental to the accused. The question of whether federal
rights are being abused should not be allowed to turn on the effectiveness of the prosecution.
The question might well be asked whether the "open door" rule
should be extended to the facts in the instant case. As noted, those
instances in federal courts where an accused has been held to have
waived rights were situations in which the accused voluntarily
testified about the search and the prosecution was allowed to use the
illegal evidence to attack his credibility. 19 In such a situation, the
waiver rule affords needed protection to the prosecution by preventing the accused from obtaining an unfair advantage in the presentation
of evidence. In the instant case, however, the accused testified after
the prosecutor had been allowed to enter testimony concerning the
search. Defense's reference to the search was an attempt to erase any
unfavorable inferences drawn by the jurors, and the prosecutor's subsequent questioning was not an attempt to impeach the accused.
Thus the prosecutor does not require the protection that the "open
door" rule is designed to offer. Since waiver results in the release of
valuable personal rights, it would seem applicable only to cases where
the accused testifies voluntarily and not where he is forced to refer to
the search.
If the instant case is a proper extension of the waiver rule, there
should, nonetheless, be a single standard determining to what extent
"the door" may be opened. Since the same constitutional right-that
of being free from unreasonable search and seizure-is involved at
both the state and federal level, a distinction in waiver standards
seems inappropriate. The vague "fundamental unfairness" test used
by the court here could encourage state prosecutors to ambiguously
refer to illegal searches in hopes of creating unfavorable inferences
in jurors' minds, thus forcing the defense to clear up the ambiguity
and, in so doing, "open the door." To allow such conduct would be
to practically destroy the deterrent effect of Mapp. Use of evidence
obtained from illegal searches should be limited to countering the
advantage the accused has obtained by his reference to the evidence.
This is the standard set out in Beno, and it is suggested that its
adoption in both state and federal courts would go far toward effectuating the aims of Mapp.
19. Supra note 13.
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Evidence-Expert Witnesses and the
Hypothetical Question-Recitation of Assumed
Facts Not Necessary When Basis of Expert's
Conclusion Is Clear
Plaintiff brought a negligence action for personal injuries received
in an airplane crash. During the trial, defendant introduced testimony
by an expert witness based in part upon the expert's own examination
of the wreckage and in part upon eyewitness accounts which bad
already been introduced in evidence.' The trial court held that the
conclusions of the expert need not be preceded by the customary
hypothetical question which states for the jury the assumed facts
upon which the expert is to base his conclusions. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Alaska, held, affirmed. Where the facts upon
which an expert witness is to base his conclusions have been made
reasonably clear to the jury through prior testimony, a hypothetical
question need not be propounded to the expert even though all of
the facts upon which he is to base his conclusion are not within his
personal knowledge. Crawford v. Rogers, 406 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1965).
Exactly when the hypothetical question requirement attained recognition as a rule of evidence is not clear. A number of early American
and English cases2 contain discussions of the propriety of eliciting a
conclusion from an expert without clarifying the exact facts upon
which he is to base his conclusion. In M'Naughten's Case,3 the
Court held that a doctor who had heard all the testimony could
not state his opinion as to the sanity of the accused unless it was
made known exactly which facts given in evidence he had believed
and which he had disregarded. The present common law rule, that
a conclusion elicited from an expert based on facts not within his
personal knowledge must be preceded by a hypothetical question4
stating the assumed facts, appears to have been well settled by 1800.
It was felt that a jury could not evaluate an expert's conclusion
without first being informed of the factual premises upon which his
conclusion is based.5 If these premises are not made known, the
1. The expert had discussed the cash with eyewitnesses earlier; the eyewitness
accounts introduced in evidence were in substance the same as the earlier accounts
given to the expert after the crash.
2. Lord Melville's Trial, 29 How. St. Tr. 1965 (1806) (Erskine, L.C.); Earl
Ferrer's Trial, 19 How. St. Tr. 943, 168 Eng. Rep. 69 (H.L. 1760).
3. 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
4. See Lord Melville's Trial, supra note 2.
5. Shapiro v. Pennsylvania R.R., 83 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Hohenstein v.
Dodds, 215 Minn. 325, 10 N.W.2d 236 (1943). A minority of jurisdictions require
the expert to state the facts upon which his opinion is based even when his knowledge
is derived from personal experience. Raub v. Carpenter, 187 U.S. 159 (1902).
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jury may accept a conclusion based upon facts which it has rejected,
or upon facts which were never presented in evidence at all; such
a result, it is said, would usurp the jury's role as trier of fact."
Today some courts recognize an exception to the general requirement in cases where the evidence is clear and without substantial
conflict.7 In such cases, an expert may be permitted to base his conclusions on all evidence presented in the courtroom. 8 Similarly, the
expert may be permitted to assume facts to be as testified to by one
witness, 9 or set of witnesses, 10 or all the witnesses for the defense,"
in cases where no material conflict exists in that particular quantum
of evidence. Thus, a recital of "assuming the truth of the testimony
given," or "on the basis of the testimony presented," or some other
similar prefatory clause is deemed equivalent to a formal hypothetical
question.' 2 Also, there are some indications of an increasing willingness by the courts to waive the formal requirement even when some
evidentiary conflict exists.' 3 Maryland v. Fischel'4 held that the
admission of expert testimony based on all the evidence was not
error where a substantial conflict in the evidence was not material
to the conclusions. 15
6. United States v. Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498 (1935), O'Brien v. Wallace, 137 Colo.
253, 259, P.2d 1028, 1031 (1958); Callahan v. Feldman, 90 Colo. 540, 544, 11 P.2d
217, 219 (1932); Quimby v. Greenhawk, 166 Md. 335, 339, 171 Ad. 59, 61 (1934);
3 U. Cm. L. REv. 334 (1936).
7. "It has been said that where the testimony is brief and simple, and especially
where there is no contradictory evidence, to ask the expert to state his opinion,
assuming the evidence given to be true, is equivalent to embodying the. evidence in
a hypothetical question." 20 Am. Jun. Evidence § 789 (1938).
Conversely, the great majority of courts have required strict adherence to the
hypothetical question requirement in cases where a "substantial" or "material" conflict
in the evidence exists, on grounds that the jury has no way of knowing upon which
conflicting set of facts the conclusion is based. Ringlehaupt v. Young, 55 Ark. 128,
17 S.W. 710 (1891) (expert witnesses are not to decide disputed questions of fact);
O'Brien v. Wallace, supra note 6, 324 P.2d at 1028 (expert testimony based on conflicting evidence invades province of jury); Quimby v. Greenhawk, supra note
6 (testimony based on all the evidence inadmissible where evidence was irreconcilably
contradictory); Hohenstein v. Dodds, supra note 5 (error to base opinion on all the
evidence when testimony is conflicting). 20 AM. Jui. Evidence § 789 (1938).
8. Arkansas Baking Co. v. Wyman, 185 Ark. 310, 47 S.W.2d 45 (1932); Maryland
v. Fishel, 228 Md. 189, 197, 179 A.2d 348, 354 (1962).
9. Hayes Creek Country Club, Inc. v. Central Pa. Quarry Stripping & Constr. Co.,
407 Pa. 464, 181 A.2d 301 (1962); Wissinger v. Valley Smokeless Coal Co., 271 Pa.
566, 115 At. 880 (1922); 2 JoNEs, EVIDENCE § 419 (5th ed. 1958).
10. Burnside v. Everette, 186 Mass. 4, 71 N.E. 82 (1904); Perryman v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 326 Mo. 176, 31 S.W.2d 4 (1930).
11. Dunagan v. Appalachian Power Co., 33 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1929).
12. Quimby v. Greenhawk, supra note 6, at 341, 171 At. at 61.
13. Callahan v. Feldman, 90 Colo. 540, 11 P.2d 217 (1932), contains dictum that
the hypothetical requirement may be set aside in certain circumstances even though
there is conflicting testimony.
14. 228 Md. 189, 179 A.2d 349 (1962).
15. The court found that testimony by one expert sufficiently revealed the assump-
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Despite these inroads, however, the common law rule has been
remarkably
durable considering the scholarly criticism directed against
it.16 Wigmore points out that hypothetical questions are often slanted
by presenting only those assumed facts most favorable to one's
position and by omitting other material facts.' 7 Another common
complaint is that extremely long, tedious and detailed hypotheticals
tend to baffle and confuse the juries rather than aid them. 18 The
most commonly suggested remedy, and the one set out in the
uniform and model acts,' 9 is to abolish the rule requiringhypotheticals
and substitute a rule whereby counsel may elect to use the hypo20
thetical form, with final discretion as to its use in the trial judge.
Under this approach the opposing party could request a specification
of the data which the witness used as a basis for his opinion; thus,
there would be sufficient protection against a misunderstanding of
the opinion where actual doubt exists.21 The commentators agree
that the complete abolition of the hypothetical form altogether would
be unworkable because in many cases the state of the evidence is
tions upon which the conclusions were based; and that the other two experts
considered the points in conflict as immaterial to their conclusions.
Medical witnesses, comprising a large proportion of experts called, are frequently
said to be exceptions to the hypothetical rule in that they are permitted to testify on
the basis of lab tests and professional reports of others, when coupled with personal
knowledge, without a statement of assumed facts. Maryland v. Fishel, supra note 8, at
194, 179 A.2d 353; Sundquist v. Madison Ry., 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392 (1928).
16. 2 JONEs, op. cit. supra note 9, § 422; McCoRMmcK, EVIDENCE § 16 (1954);
2 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 686 (3d ed. 1940).
"The hypothetical question, misused by the clumsy and abused by the clever, has
in practice led to intolerable obstruction of truth. In the first place, it has artifieally
clamped the mouth of an expert witness, so that his answer to a complex question
may not express his actual opinion on the actual case. This is because the question
may be so built up and contrived by counsel as to represent only a partisan conclusion.
In the second place, it has tended to mislead the jury as to the purport of actual
expert opinion. This is due to the same reason. In the third place, it has tended to
confuse the jury, so that its employment becomes a mere waste of time and a futile
obstruction." 2 WiGMORE, op. cit. supra § 686.
17. 2 WiGmoRE, op. cit. supra note 16, § 686. Counsel is usually permitted to select
those facts in evidence which best accord with his theory of the case. Ranger, Inc.
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 196 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1952); Cole v. Fall Brook
Coal Co., 150 N.Y. 59, 53 N.E. 670 (1899). For an example of carrying this practice to an unfortunate extreme, see Ingram v. McCuiston, 261 N.C. 392, 134 S.E.2d
705 (1964).
18. An example of the partisan abuse of the hypothetical question is seen in
Ingram v. McCuiston, supra note 17. The question itself covered six pages in the
record and contained assumed facts unsupported by evidence and wholly irrelevant
material. See also People v. Brown, 53 Mich. 531, 19 N.W. 172 (1884). For an
interesting example of the hypothetical question in legal fiction, see Crane, The
Intricacies of the Hypothetical Question, 48 MAnQ. L. REv. 350, 356 (1964).
19. MODEL CODE OF EviDENcE 409; UNIFORm ACT ON EXPERT TESTIMONY § 9;
UNiFoa_ RU=E OF EVIDENcE 58. See also N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4515.
20. 2 JONES, Op. cit. supra note 16, § 422; McCoRMXcK, op. cit. supra note 16, § 16;
2 WiGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 16, § 686.
21. 2 WiGMORE, op. cit. supra note 16, § 686.
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such that there would be no acceptable substitute to.presenting an
assumed factual basis. 2
,
In the instant case, the relevant facts concerning-the accident had
been placed before the jury by eyewitnesses prior to the expert
testimony. The court found that it was reasonably clear from the
expert's testimony that these same facts, taken together with his own
personal observation, were those upon which his conclusion was based,
and that the jury reasonably knew that the conclusion was based upon
the facts presented in evidence. The court therefore held that there
was no need for the examiner to state hypothetically the assumed
facts since the reason for the rule was lacking. One justice, concurring
in the result reached, urged the Wigmore point of view, that the
rule should be abolished as a requirement.
As noted earlier, the strict common law hypothetical question requirement is subject to exception where the evidence is clear and
unconflicting and counsel recites the assumption that previously
submitted evidence is true. This approach, however, does not dispense with the hypothetical question requirement; posing the assumption is simply an abbreviated equivalent to stating the assumed facts
in hypothetical form. It is submitted that the instant case is distinguishable from this older line of exceptions since the court does not
base its holding on the equivalent methods rationale.23 Rather, the,
court here exercised discretion in holding that the rule itself is not
necessary and hence not applicable. It did not look for a recital which
would satisfy the rule by affording an equivalent safeguard. Thus the
instant case essentially follows the Wigmore discretionary approach;
but limits the operation of discretion to one narrow situation, that
is, when the fact-premises are clear to the jury.
Controversy over the hypothetical question arose because of the
failure to articulate a workable compriomise between logic and
experience. The hypothetical question is a "logical necessity,""
resting upon the sound proposition that a conclusion cannot be
evaluated without reference to its premises. On the other hand.
experience has shown that the hypothetical question can be an
obstruction to determination of truth. That is to say, jurors can
be misled or confused by counsel's slanted use of assumed facts.
To prevent this, more responsibility and authority should be vested in
the trial judge to determine whether justice would best be served
22. 2 JONES, op. cit. supra note 16, § 422.

23. The opinion does not indicate whether the disputed question contained the
familiar reservation "on the basis of all the evidence" or "assuming all the testimony
to be true" or something similar. The court apparently does not consider such a
recital as particularly significant or necessary, though the phrase would be logically
necessary under the usual equivalency rationale.
24. 2 WGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 16, § 686.
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by permitting, requiring, or disallowing the hypothetical question
on an ad hoc basis.2 This would include the logical advantages of the
hypothetical form, yet regulate use of the question in situations
where its use does not serve the needs of the individual case. Such
an approach offers the best of both logic and experience.

Labor Law-Davis-Bacon Act-Subcontractors
on the Prime Contract Site
A construction company, prime contractor on an interstate highway
project,' leased six or seven tractors for use on the project from an
equipment rental company.2 Pursuant to the rental agreement, the
rental company from time to time sent its employees onto the
construction site to perform major repairs on the tractors, while the
prime contractor's employees made incidental repairs and performed
regular maintenance work. The Bureau of Public Roads, by letter
of March 11, 1964, requested the opinion of the Solicitor of Labor as
to whether the rental company's employees performing these on-site
repairs would be subject to the wage provisions of the prime
contract. The Solicitor replied that equipment lessors in the past
'had generally been regarded as "subcontractors," and, as such, subject
to the wage provisions of the prime contract. Accordingly, the
California Division of Highways withheld 118.71 dollars of the
amount due to the construction company. This was the sum allegedly due the company's employees as a result of their payment
at a wage rate lower than that contained in the prime contract. On
appeal to the Wage Appeals Board, held, affirmed. Equipment
rental companies are so closely related to the construction industry
as to be considered part of it for purposes of applying the DavisBacon Act3 to their employees performing work upon a construction
25. This is the central theme of all the essentially similar proposals for reform-more
discretion in the judge to make ad hoc determinations of the propriety of using the
question. 2 JONES, op. cit. supra note 16; McCownvcic, op. cit. supra note 16; 2 WIGmoE, op. cit. supra note 16.
1. Interstate Highway Project 1-015-2(8) 104.
2. The construction company hired operators for the equipment and paid them the
wage scale, arrived at in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1965), contained in the
prime contract. The prevailing wage rates for an area in which federal construction
is to be undertaken are determined by the Secretary of Labor prior to the announcement requesting bids. When the contract for construction is awarded, those rates are

included in the contract as the minimum that may be paid to workers covered by
the act.
3. 46 Stat. 1494 (1931), as amended, 49 Stat. 1011 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 2762(a)
(1964). More correctly, this case arises under the Davis-Bacon provisions of the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, 72 Stat. 895, 23 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1964).
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site. Griffith Co., 2 CCH LAB.L.
(WAB July 2, 1965).

REP. (WAGES

& HouRs) f[30996.04

The 1930's ushered in an era of high unemployment and low local
wage rates. To combat that situation the federal government undertook a vast public works program. However, the practice of award-

ing these public works contracts to the lowest bidder tended to
encourage contractors to cut costs by importing cheap labor into
the construction area. In the absence of legislation, this situation
would have resulted in further suppression of the already depressed
local wage rates. The Davis-Bacon Act was the first in a closely related
series of acts designed to affect the wages paid under public contracts.4 The act provides for the payment of the prevailing wage
rate' in the community to all mechanics 6 and laborers7 performing
their jobs directly upon the site of work8 pursuant to a contract
entered into by the United States Government for work in excess

of 2,000 dollars. Interpretation of the Davis-Bacon Act is handled
almost exclusively as a matter of administrative procedure. 9 This
4. Donahue, The Davis-Bacon Act and the Waish-Healey Public Contracts Act: A
Comparison of Coverage and Minimum Wage Provisions, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PIOB.
488 (1964). Davis-Bacon was followed by the passage of related provisions in
numerous other acts, the motivating purpose behind all being wage stability. United
States Housing Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 897, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1416(2) (1964);
Defense Housing and Community Facilities and Service Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 307,
42 U.S.C. § 1592 i (1964); School Survey and Construction Act, 72 Stat. 551 (1958),
20 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(E) (1964); Hospital Survey and Construction Act, 60 Stat.
1045 (1946), as amended, 78 Stat. 453 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 291e (1964); Federal
Civil Defense Act, 72 Stat. 533 (1958), 50 U.S.C. 2281(i) (1964).
5. 29 C.F.R. § 1.2 (1965), contains the following definitions: "The term 'prevailing
wage rate' for each classification of laborers and mechanics which the Solicitor shall
regard as prevailing in an area shall mean: (1) The rate of wages paid in the area
in which the work is to be performed, to the majority of those employed in that
classification in construction in the area similar to the proposed undertaking; (2) In
the event there is not a majority paid at the same rate, then the rate paid to the
greater number: provided such greater number constitutes 30% of those employed; or
(3) In the event that less than 30% of those so employed receive the same rate,
then the average rate."
6. A "mechanic" is a skilled workman who has learned a trade. Hearings on the
Davis-Bacon Act and its Administration Before the Special Subcommittee on Labor
of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 3, at 823
(1962).
7. A 'laborer" is one who performs manual work at a toilsome occupation requiring
physical strength as distinguished from mental training. Id. at 823.
8. "[Diirectly upon the site of the [contract] work' usually means the physical
location of the public building or work involved. But the phrase may also include
the location of contract work which is functionally and proximately connected with
contract performance. Work has been regarded as functionally and proximately
connected when it is carried out on a temporary facility established almost exclusively
to meet the needs of the contract rather than to serve the public; such facility is
located within the general area of construction; and the facility is integrated with
construction needs." Donahue, supra note 4, at 496.
9. The one exception to this administrative procedure is pointed out by the court
in E. M. Gilbert Engineering Corp. v. United States, 82 Ct. Cl. 616 (1936), in
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procedure is usually set in motion by a complaint or request for an

opinion submitted to the Solicitor of Labor.10 Either party may appeal
The
from the Solicitor's opinion to the Wage Appeals Board.
Board is the final authority 2 and its decision is binding upon the
can show that decision to be
parties to the contract, unless they
3
tainted with fraud in fact or in law.'
The most controversial aspects of Davis-Bacon interpretation have
dealt with the question of when a company is a subcontractor and

what constitutes "directly upon the site of work." However, before
attempting to analyze either of these problems it is necessary to

understand the Davis-Bacon meaning of the term, "construction."
According to the regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor,
"construction"
mean[s] all types of work done on a particular building or work at the
site thereof, including, without limitation, altering, remodeling, painting
and decorating, the transportation of materials and supplies to or from the
building or work by the employees of the construction contractor or construction subcontractor, and the manufacturing or furnishing of material,

articles, supplies, or equipment on the site of the building or work, by

persons employed at the site by the contractor of subcontractor. 14

In interpreting this term, the Solicitor of Labor has adopted the
general principle that a given activity, although not generally thought
of as "construction," may nevertheless be construction within the
meaning of Davis-Bacon, if that activity is closely related to the
primary construction. 15
With these definitions in mind, an analysis of the two problems
presented above may be undertaken. It is at once obvious that the
terms "subcontractor" and "directly upon the site" lend themselves
to a variety of interpretations. As a result almost every case demands
individualized application of these concepts to a particular set of
facts. This ad hoc process has resulted in few clear-cut rules of
general application. However, through the promulgation of regulations by the Secretary of Labor and the issuance of opinion letters
which the court said: "the decision of the Secretary of Labor in determining the
prevailing rate of wages in a community is final and conclusive and the courts have
no jurisdiction without proof of fraud or that the Secretary's action was so grossly
erroneous as to amount to fraud."

10. The request may come directly to the Solicitor, but more often it filters through
from the particular administrative agency for whom the construction is being done.
11. The procedure for such an appeal is set out in 29 C.F.R. §§ 7.2-.15 (1965).
12. 29 C.F.R. § 7.1 (1965).
13. E. M. Gilbert Engineering Corp., supra note 9, at 617; see Note, 18 VAND.
L. B-v. 1869, 1886-87 (1965).
14. 29 C.F.R. § 3.2(b) (1965).
15. Infia note 24.
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by the Solicitor, certain standards have been 6 established against
which the facts of each case may be evaluated.'
Generally, a subcontractor is one engaged in construction, that is,
he undertakes the performance of a part of the prime contract.1
Although the wording of the act does not specifically exempt materialmen from its coverage, Congress apparently intended that a distinction be drawn between subcontractors and materialmen. 18 Only
the former were thought to be engaged in construction.19 Thus, the
scope of the term "subcontractors" has turned upon the distinction
between the functions of materialmen and construction workers.
An examination of certain opinions bears out this analysis. One
case 20 involved a prime contractor who, because of local suppliers'
inability to deliver all the concrete they produced, contracted with a
petroleum carrier to deliver the concrete from the supplier to the
construction site. The truck drivers, some driving the petroleum
company trucks and some driving their own trucks, 21 did not handle
the concrete once they had delivered it. The Solicitor held that the
drivers were not engaged in construction and, therefore, were not
subcontractors. Similarly, truck drivers of a quarry company who
hauled gravel to the construction site, lifted the tailgate of the
truck, and drove slowly along the road actually spreading the gravel,
were held not to be subcontractors.22 The Solicitor felt it was significant that the drivers performed very little extra work in lifting
the tailgate and driving along the road; moreover, "tailgating" was
an established method of delivery among quarry operators in that
area. In contrast, in a case involving oil spreading activities by the
drivers of an oil company, the Solicitor held that the drivers were
16. One of the early standards adopted by the Solicitor in determining who is a
subcontractor is the 20% rule. Briefly, this rule raises a rebuttable presumption that
someone who spends a substantial amount of his time performing work on the
construction site is a subcontractor. As an aid in ascertaining what is substantial,
the Solicitor has said that spending 20% of one's time performing on the contract
site will generally be considered substantial. This is not, however, an inflexible rule.
Under certain conditions, time amounting to more than 20% might not be substantial,
while under different conditions less than 20% might be substantial.
17. Supra note 6, at 830.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibi.
20. H. B. Zachry Co. v. United States, 344 F.2d 352 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
21. The rule with regard to owner-drivers was established by Opinion Letters of
Solicitor of Labor No. DB-9, 2 CCH LAB. L. REP. (WAGES & HouMs) ff 30514 (September 13, 1961), and No. DB-12, 2 CCH LAB L. REP. (WAGES & Houns f[30514
(September 26, 1961). In these letters the Solicitor announced that he would not apply
the Davis-Bacon Act to legitimate owner-operators of trucks (or similar hauling equipment) who are independent contractors because at that time there was no workable
procedure for insuring enforcement of the Act.
22. Opinion Letter of Solicitor of Labor No. DB-14, 2 CCH LAB. L. RE,. (WAGES
& HouRs) f[30573 (October 13, 1961).
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subcontractors. s The circumstances were much the same as in the
"tailgating" case: the oil company employees delivered the oil to
the road beds in tank trucks to which were attached spreading bars,
and then drove along the road spreading oil. The Solicitor distinguished this case from the "tailgating" case on the basis of the
complexity of the oil spreading operation. Here, there was strict
adherence to contract specifications, use of special equipment, and
utilization of special skills. The supplier was actually undertaking
the performance of a part of the construction work.
Another source of recurring litigation has been the meaning of
the term, "upon the site of work." Troublesome problems have
arisen where the subcontractor or his employees were not physically
on the site of construction. In these cases one or more of the following factors have been considered to bring the employee within the
scope of the phrase, "directly upon the site of work": (1) the subcontractor was serving one contractor exclusively; (2) the subcontractor was operating out of temporary facility for the term of the
prime contract; and (3) the work of the subcontractor was so closely
related to that of the prime contractor as to be considered a part
of it. In this area of controversy the Solicitor appears to have drawn
some fine distinctions. In one case,24 a supplier had established a
temporary plant in the general area of the construction-though not
within the physical confines of the construction site-in order to
furnish the prime contractor concrete bases for transmission line
towers. The Solicitor noted that the facility was established to meet
the specific needs of this particular prime contractor, and that
the work of the supplier was so directly essential and closely related,
both geographically and functionally, to that of the prime contractor
as to be actually "upon the site of work." It had been previously stated
that a subcontractor cannot remove himself from Davis-Bacon coverage by merely moving his operation from the physical confines of
the construction site.' In another case, a subcontractor, producing
materials immediately on the construction site, moved his operation
three miles down the road. The Solicitor held that because the
subcontractor still furnished materials almost exclusively to one
contractor, and made no substantial sales to the general public, he
was still functionally working upon the site of construction. 26 Shortly
23. Opinion Letter of Solicitor of Labor No. DB-28, 2 CCH LAB. L. REP. (WAGES

& Houris)

ff 30684 (October 8, 1962).

24. Opinion Letter of Solicitor of Labor No. DB-30, 2 CCH LAB. L. REP. (WAGES
& Hoturs) [ 30702 (October 15, 1962).

25. Opinion Letter of Solicitor of Labor No. DB-15, 2 CCH LAB. L. REP. (WAGES
& Houns) 30574 at 40288 (October 13, 1961).
26. This question is not without conflict, however, as is demonstrated by U.S. Comptroller General's Opinion No. B-148076, 2 CCH LAB. L. REXP. (WAGES & Houns) 1
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thereafter the meaning of the phrase "upon the site of work" was
refined to its greatest degree in an opinion of the Solicitor dealing
with the prefabrication of component parts for buildings. In this
opinion, a corporate prefabricator of roof panels which had leased
a building off the construction site, applied for a license to do additional business, and was bidding for additional public work. It was
held that the company was a genuine materialman. 27 A further
factor considered was that the panels had to be maintained at a
certain temperature and this was not possible at the job site. On the
other hand, in a case involving a prefabricator of wall sections, 28
whose full capacity was being used by the prime contractor, and who,
therefore, made no effort to solicit business from the general public,
the Solicitor held that the prefabricator was in reality a subcontractor.
In the instant case the Board arrived at two determinations. The
first holding deals with the classification of equipment rental dealers
for purposes of Davis-Bacon coverage. The Board frames the issue
in the case as being a question of "whether employees of equipment
dealers who go on the construction sites to repair equipment pursuant
to lease arrangements are covered by the Davis-Bacon Act, and29
whether rental dealers doing on-site repair work on leased equipment
are subcontractors." The Board then answers the question by holding
that the equipment rental business is so interrelated with the construction industry that it must be considered a part of that industry
for purposes of Davis-Bacon coverage; and since the construction
company is performing work on the site pursuant to a contract,
it is governed by the provisions of the Davis-Bacon Act. Furthermore, the employees are going onto the prime construction site
to perform services directly related to the ultimate -objective of the
prime contract. The second holding states that these equipment30763 at 40495-34 (July 26, 1963), in which he said: "In our considered opinion the
Davis-Bacon Act does not undertake to provide minimum wage coverage for work
off the site, whether by contractors, subcontractors, or materialmen, even though performed in the immediate community." The Comptroller General was of the opinion
that since the work "directly" as used in the act, modified the phrase "upon the site
of work," it necessarily confined the limits of the site to the actual physical premises
upon which the prime contract was being carried out. To best understand the
ramifications of this case some explanation of the respective authority of the
Comptroller General and the Solicitor of Labor is necessary. The Solicitor heads the
legal section of the Department of Labor. The Secretary of Labor is vested with the
power to compile wage data, determine wage rates, and enforce these rates. The
Comptroller General, on the other hand, has the responsibility of withholding payments
due laborers and mechanics and compiling and circulating a list of contractors who
have violated the act to such a degree as to be blacklisted.
27. Opinion Letter of Solicitor of Labor No. DB-10, 2 CCH LAB. L. REP. (WAGEs
& Houns) II30526 (August 2, 1961).
28. Ibid.
29. Griffith Co., 2 WAGE & Hounts SEnv. 1 30996.04, at 40513 (July 2, 1965).
(Emphasis added.)
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rental employees -need not be paid the same rates as construction
employees even though the former were classified with the latter
for purposes- of Davis-Bacon coverage. In connection with its investigation of wage rates, the Board stated that it thought the fact
that union contracts and collective bargaining procedure in the
local community might have a far-reaching effect on community rates
was of little consequence since Davis-Bacon is to serve merely as
a "mirror" of the community wage level and not as a tool for
adjusting the prevailing local wage.
Before discussing the Board's holding, there is some language in
the opinion which deserves comment. After stating the holding,
the Board went on to say: "We do not have to decide whether they
are subcontractors, independent contractors, or some other kind of
contractor obligated pursuant to an equipment lease arrangement. 30
It is submitted that this statement cannot be accepted at face value
primarily due to the traditional distinction between materialmen and
subcontractors. The plain import of the above quoted statement is
that anyone performing work upon the site of the prime contract
is covered by the act whether he is a materialman or subcontractor.
There are a number of reasons why such an interpretation would be
unacceptable. First, the following words of the act itself would belie
any such interpretation: "The contractor or his subcontractor shall
pay all mechanics and laborers employed directly upon the site
of the work ..,,31
Clearly these words apply only to contractors and subcontractors,
not to materialmen. In addition, the congressional intent2 was that
materialmen be exempted from the coverage of Davis-Bacon. The
Board itself recognizes this distinction between materialmen and
-subcontractors in this very case. The Board says:
In most situations, the administrative agency will have no particular problem
in determining whether or not a contractor engaged upon the site of the
work is a subcontractor for Davis-Bacon Act purposes. If it is convinced
that the particular employer is a subcontractor, it will issue a determination

based on coverage. Conversely if it is convinced that a particular employer
is a materialman, a supplier, or otherwise not a subcontractor, it will refuse
to find coverage. 33

Thus it appears that the statement by the Board, that it need
not find the Griffith Company to be a subcontractor in order to find
coverage .under the act should not be taken literally. On the other
-

30.
31.
32.
33.

rd. at 40515.
49 Stat. 1012 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 2762(2) (1964).
Supra note 6, at 830.
Supra note 30.
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hand, the facts of the instant case plainly illustrate that the equipment rental dealer is a subcontractor, performing "on site work"
and hence covered by the Davis-Bacon Act.
The Board's decision seems to be in line with authority, particularly
with the more recent opinions cited above. The operative facts in
the instant case are clearer than in most of the cases cited by the
Board. Since the equipment rental company agreed to furnish
equipment for an indefinite time and to perform all major repairs
on that equipment, it seems evident that it undertook to perform a
part of the prime contract. This situation is to be distinguished from
the case in which the prime contractor buys equipment, and the
vendor comes upon the site to service the equipment pursuant to
a warranty agreement. Here the Solicitor has held that there is
an actual purchase and the vendor is not a subcontractor. The
difference in these two situations lies in the nature of the services
furnished to the prime contractor. In the case of a lease agreement,
the prime contractor probably wants the equipment for the duration
of prime contract and no longer. The lessor must insure the continuous
operation of the machinery by making needed repairs. The lease
agreement may extend over a period of years, and old machines may
be replaced with new ones. On the other hand, in the purchase
agreement the service of the vendor has no relation to the duration
of the prime contract. The vendor services machinery he has sold
for a definite time, regardless of who purchased his product or their
purpose for so doing. This service is only incidental to his primary
function as a vendor of equipment.
The instant decision points out an obvious conflict between the
express language of the act and the intent of the law-makers in-passing
the Davis-Bacon Act. The phrase "employed directly upon the site
of work" would seem to protect only those workers who perform
work on the prime contract site. Yet the purpose of Congress in
passing the Davis-Bacon Act was to prevent the depression of the
wage rate prevailing in the local community. That purpose could not
possibly be effectuated by excluding employees of obvious subcontractors merely because the work they perform is across the street rather
than directly upon the prime contract site. Thus it appears that in
order to give effect to congressional intent, the Solicitor must continue
his policy of including workers who are constructively on the work
site; that is, workers directly related to the prime contract, either geographically or functionally. Conversely, the Comptroller General
contends that the phrase "directly upon the site" should be construed
literally.4 It is his contention that only those workers who, perform
34. Supra note 26.
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tasks on the actual physical premises of the prime contract are
covered by the act. While this conflict perhaps illustrates the need
for closer coordination in the administration of the act, one should
not lose sight of the fact that in this area of determining coverage the
Secretary is the sole authority, not the Comptroller General.
The Board's examination of union contracts to determine the prevailing wage rates may seem questionable; for this practice appears
to give unions, and, for that matter, companies, a great deal of
influence in the administration of Davis-Bacon. A consideration of
the philosophy of the Davis-Bacon Act, however, reveals that this
situation is not contrary to the purpose of the act. Since this purpose
is to reflect community wages and not to establish them, the manner
in which prevailing wage rates are determined is not important, so
long as the prevailing rate for that community is accurately determined. In a highly organized region, such as involved here, union
contracts very probably are the most accurate sources for establishing
prevailing wage rates. 35 Since legislation such as Davis-Bacon, being
remedial in nature, is entitled to a reading most likely to effectuate
its purpose, cases in the future are likely to follow the liberal construction given the act in this case. The Solicitor will look to the substantive relationship between the parties to determine if Davis-Bacon
coverage is appropriate.

Labor Law-The NLRB and
Individualized Remedies Under 10(c)
For 8(a) (1) Violations
When apprised that eleven of twenty-three employees had signed
union authorization cards, an employer embarked upon an anti-union
campaign in which he unlawfully interfered with employee rights
accorded by section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.' His conduct consisted of threatening layoffs and curtailment of operations,
sponsoring withdrawals from union membership and disclaimers of
interest in union representation, and promising and granting wage
increases to discourage further union support. Thereafter the em35. 29 C.F.R. § 1.3(b)(2) (1965), specifically directs the Solicitor to examine
signed collective bargaining agreements in making his determination of prevailing
wage rates.
1. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §
157 (1964): "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining...."
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ployer rejected the union's bargaining request. The trial examiner
found no 8(a) (5) refusal to bargain,2 since the union had never
represented a majority of the employees; and to remedy the above
violations of section 8(a) (1)3 he recommended the posting of notices.
The union filed exceptions4 with the National Labor Relations Board,
contending that this proposed remedy was inadequate to cure the
effects of the employer's unfair labor practices and that the issuance
of a bargaining order was appropriate. Held, the majority principle
of section 9(a)5 does not permit the issuance of a bargaining order
when majority status has never been attained; but the Board under
section 10(c)6 can direct that an employer who has committed serious
acts of interference during an organizational campaign make available
to the union suitable facilities for a meeting with the employees on
company time. H. W. Elson Bottling Co., 155 N.L.R.B. No. 63 (1965).
Section 10(c) authorizes the Board not only to issue a cease-anddesist order but also to take such affirmative remedial action as will
effectuate the policies of the act. The wording of this section indicates
a congressional intent to allow the Board to fashion individual remedies appropriate for the particular situation. Nevertheless, appellate courts have not hesitated to modify Board orders upon finding
that they are "arbitrary" 7 or "punitive rather than remedial."8 The
use of such labels has been criticized as being, in many instances, the
mere statement of a conclusion made without close analysis of the
Board's reasoning.9 In NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co.,10 the Supreme
2. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (5), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5) (1964): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(5)
To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to
the provisions of section 9(a)."

3. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1964): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights

guaranteed in section 7."
4. In its Statement of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. § 101.11(b) (1963), the Board authorizes this privilege.
5. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964): "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes
of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all employees in such unit .. "

6. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 160(c)

(1964): "If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the

Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in
or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings
of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such

person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative
action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will
effectuate the policies of this subchapter .... "
7. Morrison-Knudson Co. v. NLRB, 275 F.2d 914, 918 (2d Cir. 1960).
8. NLRB v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 241 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1957).
9. Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 93 (1963).
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Court of the United States refused to review the appropriateness of a
Board order on the basis of whether it was "remedial" or "punitive."
Instead, the Court said: "It seems more profitable to stick closely to
the direction of the Act by considering what order does.., and what
order does not, bear appropriate relation to the policies of the Act.""
Supreme Court decisions have firmly established a broad discretionary
power of the Board 2 and have recognized a need for flexibility in
remedial orders. 13 Recently, in considering whether a Board order
effectuated the policies of the act, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
position that the Board's authority under section 10(c) should be
liberally construed. 14
While apparently having the power to dispense adequate, individualized remedies for section 8(a) (1) violations, the Board has been
criticized for its failure to do so,' 5 and for reliance instead upon a
standard cease-and-desist order coupled with the posting of notices. 16
Such a remedy often allows an employer to defeat unionization indefinitely, while incurring only an insignificant penalty. Furthermore,
since such inadequate remedies fail to deter other employers from
similar violations, the Board is burdened with an ever-increasing caseload.'7 The resulting delay in remedying unfair labor practices committed during an organizational drive is extremely prejudicial because
of the loss of interest which occurs while awaiting adjudication of the
charges. To correct the present situation stronger remedies have been
10. 344 U.S. 344 (1953). "It is the business of the Board to give coordinated effect
to the policies of the Act. We prefer to deal with these realities and to avoid entering
into the bog of logomachy, as we are invited to, by debate about what is 'remedial' and
what is 'punitive."' Id. at 348.
11. Id. at 348.
12. Frank Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944); NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co.
314 U.S. 512, 513 (1942); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188-89
(1941).
13. See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., supra note 10, at 346.
14. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964).
15. SuBcomm. ox NLRB, HousE Co
. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 87mi CONG,,
IsT SF-ss., ADMINISTRATION OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr BY niE
NLRB (Comm. Print 1961); Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HAnv. L. 11Ev. 38, 124
(1964); Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 69 (1963).
16. Bridgeport Brass Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1332 (1961), is quite similar to the instant
case and is an example of the Board's reliance on cease and desist orders. Here also
-the union lacked only one card of having a majority before the employer threatened
and interrogated employees, discharged a key union employee, and threatened to shut
,down the plant.' Following these acts, the union lost the election. The only affirmative
action ordered, other than reinstatement and payment of back wages, was the posting
of notices.
17. The number of unfair labor practice charges filed in the Board's 1964 fiscal
year was 15,620 as opposed to only 11,357 in fiscal year 1960. 29 NLRB ANN. REP.
5 (1964).
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proposed,18 including criminal sanctions for wilful violations, punitive
damages similar to those available in antitrust actions, and greater
use of the preliminary injunction authorized by section 10(j). 19 Another corrective device, and one that is increasingly being applied, is
the order to bargain. This is available when an employer, without
having a good faith doubt as to the union's majority status, refuses
to bargain in violation of section 8(a) (5). In Frank Brothers v.
NLRBm2 the Supreme Court enforced such an order even though the
complaining union no longer represented a majority of the employees.
The remedy has also been applied to correct 8(a) (1) violations if the
union once represented a majority, even though the employer has not
been guilty of an 8(a) (5) refusal to bargain.2 1 An eminent labor
commentator, Professor Bok, recently suggested that an order to
bargain is an appropriate remedy for serious 8(a) (1) violations even
in the absence of a pre-existing majority.P
The Board rejected the union's argument that this proposal be
adopted in the instant case on the ground that it would violate the
majority principle of section 9(a). However, recognizing that the
trial examiner's recommendation of posting notices would be insufficient to remedy the unfair labor practices which had dissipated the
union's strength, the Board ordered that the union be allowed to
hold a meeting on company time and property before the representation election.
18. Bok, supranote 15, at 124-32.
19. National Labor Relations Act § 10(j), 61 Stat. 149 (1948), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j)
(1964): "The Board shall have the power upon issuance of a complaint as provided
in subsection (b) charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in. an unfair
labor practice, to petition any United States district court wherein the unfair labor
practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person resides or
transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order." This discretionary injunction, which is intended to preserve or restore the status quo pending
adjudication of the complaint, was applied for by the Board a total of only 7 times in
the Board's fiscal years 1959-1961. Address by Chairman McCulloch, Federal Bar
Association Convention July 13, 1964, in 15 LAB. L.J. 755, 760 (1964). The use of
this remedy is on the increase as evidenced by the fact that in fiscal 1964, the Board
filed 18 petitions under § 10(j). 29 NLRB ANx. REP. 133 (1964). The potential of
this remedy lies primarily in discriminatory discharge cases.
20. Supra note 12.
21. NLRB v. Delight Bakery, Inc., 353 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1965); Summit Mining
Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Caldarera, 209 F.2d 265
(8th Cir. 1954); D. H. Holmes Co. v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1950); Bannon
Mills, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 611 (1964). In a well reasoned opinion, NLRB v. Flomatic
Corp., 347 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1965), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals indicated
recently that an order to bargain for an 8(a)(1) should be issued with restraint. The
court said it should not be issued for "a borderline, unaggravated 8(a)(1)." Id. at
79. The court indicated that such an order is appropriate for 8(a) (1) violations when
there is an "aggressive or planned campaign aimed at dissipating union strength ....
Id. at 78.
22. Bok, supranote 15, at 132-39.
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This decision is significant in two respects: the Board's upholding of
the principle of majority rule, and its use of a creative, individualized
remedy. Professor Bok has presented an excellent argument for
applying the order to bargain in a situation such as the instant one.23
He points out, in rebuttal to the idea that the wishes of the majority
of the employees are always controlling, that unions are often granted
bargaining rights even though their majority status has evaporated
through normal employee turnover since the unfair labor practice
occurred. 24 However, in a situation like Frank Brothers, a bargaining
order is justified; by granting the union the opportunity to negotiate a
contract-a right it had previously earned-the Board is only attempting
a restoration of the conditions antedating the unfair labor practice.
Likewise, the Board, in the instant case, recognized the unique effectiveness of speeches on company time and property,2 and it felt that
the momentum of the organizational campaign following the speech
should approximate that existing prior to the employer's unlawful
conduct. Had a bargaining order been issued, the union would have
been given a right to which it had never been entitled. The Board
rejected the union's argument that a bargaining order was appropriate because it would have achieved majority status-the quid pro quo
for the right to bargain-but for the 8(a) (1) violations. On this point
Professor Bok contends that the majority principle of section 9(a)
should be disregarded if a "substantial proportion" of employees had
signed cards prior to the unfair labor practices and there was a
"reasonable possibility that the union would have ultimately prevailed.
.. "2 However, the fairness of a bargaining order to both employer 7
and employees in a situation where the union could not even obtain a
card majority seems highly questionable in light of the circumstances
often surrounding the signing of authorization cards&? The Board
23. ibid.
24. Id. at 134. Another example of when an employer may be required to bargain
with a minority union is found in Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 59 (1965). In this
"run-away shop" case, the employer was ordered to bargain with the union at a new
plant site in another state where the union had never represented a majority.
25. Note, 61 YALE L.J. 1066, 1074-76 (1952); Comment, 14 U. Cm. L. REv. 104,
108-10 (1946).
26. Bok, &upra note 15, at 138. Bok suggests that 30% of the employees might be
sufficient. Ibid.
27. A strong argument that an employer should be entitled to a secret election in
every representation case regardless of the number of pledge cards signed is found in
Sandier, Another Worry for Employers, U.S. News & World Report, March 15, 1965,
pp. 86-89.
28. "While an employer may not segregate a union employee in order to hold him
up to the ridicule of his fellows, it will scarcely be asserted that labor organizations are
forbidden to ostracize nonmembers or to impose other social pressures on them."
Cox & BoK, CASES ON LABOR LAw 288 (6th ed. 1965). (Emphasis added.) Any
misunderstanding on the part of employees when they sign the card as to what the
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itself has on occasion commented on the unreliability of these cards.2
Furthermore, if a majority of employees do in fact desire union
representation, an order such as that issued in the instant case may
eventually produce a more meaningful collective bargaining agreement than would a naked bargaining order. This is true because an
order to bargain when the union does not presently represent a
majority is often an ineffective remedy. The chances of a union in
such a position being able to pressure an employer into significant
concessions are slight. On the other hand, the order issued here
gives the union the use of what many regard as the most effective
campaign forum.30 Majority support may well be achieved, and
following the election the union may bargain from a position of
strength.
The value of individualized remedies has been recognized in
criminal law as exemplified in the indeterminate sentence, probations,
and paroles. Labor law has long needed similar innovations, and the
instant decision may well be a significant step in this direction. While
any given 8(a) (1) violation will involve similar legal issues, it is
significant to determine whether it may have been the employer's first
or fourth offense; whether it may have been wilful or inadvertant;
and whether it may have been serious or inconsequential. The Board's
reliance on standard orders, due to its pressing caseload, results in
failure to undo the effects of the violation in most instances. The need
for more effective, individualized remedies can best be satisfied by
greater creativity on the part of the trial examiners, for they are the
officials most aware of the peculiar and specific needs of each situation.
If the trial examiners realize that the remedies they recommend are
equally as important as their conclusions of law, and if the Board
will defer to their proposals, orders that will be both truly remedial
and also preventive will result.
card means is immaterial. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732, 743 (D.C. Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
29. Sunbeam Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 546, 550-51 (1952); Midwest Piping & Supply
Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1070 n.13 (1945). While it is true that in both of these cases
there were two competing unions, it is difficult to see why cards would be any more
reliable when it is just a union and an employer competing. The Board's approach
to the reliability of cards in these two cases should be compared with that implicit in
Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964). For judicial commentary on the
reliability of authorization cards, see NLRB v. Johnnie's Poultry Co., 344 F.2d 617
(8th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Peterson Bros., 342 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1965). It would
seem apparent that distrust of the reliability of these cards becomes most important
where the refusal to bargain is the sole violation charged.
30. Supra note 25.
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Oil and Gas-Function of Purchasing Natural
Gas at Wholesale Is a Service for the
Purpose of the Natural Gas Act and Cannot
Be Withdrawn Without FPC Approval
Purchaser, an interstate pipeline company, entered into a ten-yearprimary-term' contract with seller, an independent producer of natural
gas, for the purchase of natural gas at a fixed rate. 2 Subsequent to
execution of the contract seller sought and obtained a certificate of
public convenience and necessity 3 from the Federal Power Commission
authorizing this proposed sale of gas. The purchaser obtained a similar
certificate authorizing him to construct the necessary facilities. The
contract was satisfactorily performed; but, after failing to secure a
continuation of the contract beyond the primary term at increased
rates, seller notified purchaser of termination4 and filed timely notice
of increased rates with the FPC. 5 This unilateral increase was approved and became effective upon expiration of the primary term.
Purchaser refused to take the gas at the new rates, 6 and the seller
petitioned the FPC for relief.7 The Commission held that non-use of
1. The primary term is that fixed time period for which the contract is operative.
It is followed by a secondary term which, subject to other limitations contained in
the contract, normally extends for the period in which the property is worked. Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Reid, 161 Tex. 88, 337 S.W.2d 267 (1960). In the instant case the
primary term was for ten years and the secondary term was limited by the power
of either party to terminate the agreement by giving notice within ninety days of
expiration of the primary term.
2. 18 C.F.R. § 154.1 (1964), requires all natural gas companies to file with the
Commission, in conformity with the requirements set forth in 18 C.F.R. §§ 154.1-.86
(1964), schedules for all its rates and charges for transportation or sale of natural
gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, together with all contracts in any
manner affecting or relating thereto.
3. § 7(c), 52 Stat. 825 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1964) states
that: "No natural-gas company . . . shall engage in the transportation or sale
of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or undertake the
construction or txtension of any facilities therefor . . . unless there is in force with
respect to such natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and necessity
issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or operations.
4. See note 1 srupra.
5. For the procedure which must be followed to increase rates, see Natural Gas
Act, § 4(d), 52 Stat. 823 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1964). Proceedings for
rate changes take place under, Natural Gas Act § 4(e), 52 Stat. 823 (1938), 15
U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1964). See also 18 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.50, 154.1-.86 (1964).
6. Purchaser shut off the valve which allowed gas to flow from producer's pipeline
into -his own upon expiration of the primary term-January 13, 1963.
7. Seller petitioned the FPC to direct purchaser to show cause why it should not
be required to take further deliveries at the currently filed and effective rate. Instead,
the FPC directed purchaser to show cause why it should not be required to apply
for and obtain Commission approval before ceasing to operate the facilities it had
used to purchase gas from seller. After a hearing, the trial examiner dismissed the
show cause order. The matter then went to the Commission itself for review.
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facilities due to a cessation of purchases constituted an "abandonment" under section 7(b) of the Natural Gas Act." Since the Commission had not given permission for the abandonment, it ordered
resumption of pipeline purchases. 9 On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held, although the Natural
Gas Act does not require the function of purchasing gas to be certified, 10 the FPC is competent to compel a "natural gas company"
to continue the service of purchasing gas even though its contract of2
sale has expired and seller has unilaterally increased its rates.1
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 350 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1965).

In 1938, because the monopolistic nature of the natural gas industry
13
had resulted in excessive consumer prices, the Natural Gas Act
was enacted to regulate the aspects of the natural gas industry. By
1942 there was in force a regulatory system typified by the requirement that certificates of public convenience and necessity be secured
to operate in the industry.' 4 The FPC, administrator of the act,' 5
was given the power under section 7(b) to forbid a natural gas
company to "abandon . . . any portion . . . of its facilities . . . or

any portion of its services rendered by means of these facilities
without permission .

.

. of the Commission . .. and the finding . . .

that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such
abandonment. " 16 Until the instant case buyers of gas had not been
required to continue purchases, for it was felt that the act did not
8. Natural Gas Act § 7(b), 52 Stat. 824 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1964),
states: "No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of
such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had
and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the available
supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is
unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit
such abandonment."
9. The Commission opinion is found at 31 F.P.C. 1079 (1965).
10. See note 3 supra.
11. Natural Gas Act § 2(p), 52 Stat. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717a(6) (1964)
states: "'Natural gas company means a person engaged in the transportation of
natural gas in interstate commerce, or the sale in interstate commerce of such gas
for resale."
12. Note that this opinion determined only the competence of the FPC to regulate
a purchaser of natural gas, whereas the opinion of the FPC assumed competence and
dealt only with the remedy.
13. 52 Stat. 821-33 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-17w (1964).
14. See note 3 supra.
15. Natural Gas Act § 16, 52 Stat. 839 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1964), created
and empowered the Commission to perform any act necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of the Natural Gas Act.
16. 52 Stat. 824 (1938), 15 U.S.C. 717f(b) (1964). For full text of § 7(b), see
note 8 supra.
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regulate such buyers in their role as purchasers 17 but only as operators
of facilities. Sellers, on the other hand, have been regulated both as
operators of facilities 8 and as sellers of gas.19 It was early held that
a reduction in the quantity of gas delivered, while not an abandonment of facilities, was an abandonment of services and hence within
the power of the Commission to regulate. 20 More recently, abandonment of a service was held to include the withdrawal of any constituent element necessary for the continued transmission of natural
gas in interstate commerce. Thus, refusal to sell gas has been held
to be an abandonment of a service. 1 While buyers, as such, had
still not been directly regulated at the time of the instant case, the
seller's portion of the sales transaction, to which buyers were direct
and necessary parties, had been defined as a service and hence within
the competence of the Commission to regulate.
In the instant case, the court held that for purposes of determining
the applicability of section 7(b) of the Natural Gas Act, "service'
includes those elements of a sale of natural gas contributed by either
party. Hence, both seller and purchaser were rendering services
during the primary term of the contract. Section 7(b), therefore,
prohibits the purchaser from ceasing his purchases without the Commission's permission, even though the primary term of the contract
under which such sales were made has expired and no agreement
has been executed. 22 Inasmuch as the purchaser is under an obligation to continue its services until excused, a duty to pay for the
gas received is imposed as a necessary incident to receipt. Until the
purchaser obtains a contrary ruling from the FPC, he will be bound
by the existing prices as filed with and approved by the FPC. 23 A
second line of reasoning was used by the court to reach the same
result. It held that dedication of facilities to the public convenience
and necessity imposes an obligation, under section 7(b), not to
abandon such facilities. This obligation requires that the facilities be
used for the purpose for which they were dedicated. Thus, a
17. By way of dictum in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis, 358 U.S. 103,

113 (1958), and United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U.S. 332
343 (1956), the Court set forth the doctrine that the rate-making powers of natural
gas companies, except as specifically limited by the act, were no different from those

they would have possessed in the absence of the act.
18. J.M. Huber Corp. v. FPC, 236 F.2d 550, 556 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
971 (1957) (facilities used in supplying gas to pipeline were held to be subject to
FPC jurisdiction and could not be abandoned without permission of the FPC).
19. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FP, 364 U.S. 137 (1960) (one vho engages
in the transportation or sale of natural gas is performing a "service").
20. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 117 F.2d 942
(1949) (reduction in quantity of natural gas delivered is an abandonment of a service).
21. See note 19 supra.
22. 350 F.2d 689, 697 (5th Cir. 1965).
23. Id. at 698.

1966 ]

RECENT CASES

purchaser, having dedicated his facilities, is bound to continue usage
of them until excused in accordance with section 7(b).4
Crucial to the holding in the instant case is a finding that the
FPC is competent to require a purchaser of natural gas to continue
his purchases even though the contract of sale has expired. If there
is implicit in such a finding a determihnation that Congress intended
the FPC to be competent to regulate purchases of gas, it is submitted
that the holding is at best on weak grounds. The statute itself is
noncommital as to the intent of Congress with respect to the issue
in this case. By authorizing regulation of a "sale [of gas] for resale
in interstate commerce,"2 the statute could be interpreted, without
more, to encompass the entire sales transaction, including the activities
of both parties to the sale. However, during the Senate debates
the chairman of the approving committee stated as to the scope of the
act that "It is limited to transportation in interstate commerce, and it
affects only those who sell gas wholesale."2 In addition, the relevant
provision of an alternative bill which would have specifically included
purchasers and purchasing within the regulatory purview of the FPC
was rejected by the Senate.27 There is also evidence of judicial
awareness of this Congressional intent to limit the application of
the act. Two Supreme Court cases contain dictum2 8 supporting the
use of competitive interplay in rate changes.2 9 Finally, those econ24. Id. at 693.
25. Natural Gas Act § 1(b), 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1964),
provides: "The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural
gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for
resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any
other use, and to natural gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but
shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local
distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the
production or gathering of natural gas."
26. 81 CoNG. REc. 9312 (1937).
27. See H.R. 5711 and S. 1919, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937), which provide:
"This Act shall apply to the procurement of natural gas for the purpose of its transmission through pipe lines and its sale, exchange, transmission, or distribution in
interstate commerce .... ." This proposal would have expressly identified purchasers
as a category for regulation. It was not adopted, however, and the present section
1(b) was adopted.
28. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 343
(1956) (there the Court said: "The initial rate-making and rate-changing powers
of natural gas companies remain undefined and unaffected by the Act."). See also
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis, 358 U.S. 103, 113 (1958), which indicated
approval of United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., supra, and stated:
"It seems plain that Congress, in so drafting the statute, was not only expressing its
conviction that the public interest requires the protection of consumers from
excessive prices for natural gas, but was also manifesting concern for the legitimate
interests of the natural gas companies in whose financial stability the gas-consuming
public has a vital stake."
29. Moreover, judicial extensions of Commission competence in other areas than
that in the instant case have been repudiated by Congress. For example, the Court
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omists who have studied the natural gas industry in recent years
conclude that more, rather than less, reliance on competitive price
setting is desirable. 30 The instant case counters this economists' view
by installing a regulatory price-setting mechanism in the place of a
free bargaining mechanism, hence hindering the operation of the
free enterprise system. In the face of this, can it be said that it
was within the intent of Congress, or the sphere of good sense, to
grant the FFC competence to impose obligations to purchase on pipeline purchasers beyond the contract period? It is submitted that
Congress intended not only to refrain from exercising its maximum
powers under the interstate commerce clause, but also to define
carefully Commission powers. The court in the instant case should
have given deference to that intention. Merely because the grant of
competence in the act allows some latitude in interpretation is no
justification for reaching a result which is contrary to Congressional
intent, judicial expression, and sound economic theory.
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954) extended the jurisdiction
of the FPC to include independent producers of natural gas, although the prevailing opinion for the sixteen years since the act had been passed was that it did
not apply to independent producers. In the next session of Congress, the HarrisFullbright Bill, H.R. 6645, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), was brought forth to
overrule Phillips by exempting independent producers from Commission jurisdiction.
The bill passed both houses of Congress but was vetoed by the President.
30. CoxENBoo, COMPEnTrON IN THE FIELD MAKEr FOR NATURAL GAS (Rice
Institute Pamphlet vol. 44, No. 4, 1958); McKrE, TIE REGULAMTON OF NATURAL GAS
(American Enterprise Ass'n, National Economic Problems, No. 465, 1957).

